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Shorebank 1998 Annual Review· Executive Summary Table 
Overall 
Comments 
August-
September 
Flood Impact 
• Against an overall backdrop ofBRAC program strength, four 
primary concerns have surfaced in Shorebank's 1998 Review: (a) 
funding flood-driv~ loan {!em and; (b) effectively managing 
organizational growth; (c) controlling the BRAC cost structure; and 
(d) strengthening the BRAC savings program. We see growth 
management as the most serious long-term issue facing BRAC, and 
the liqwdity crunch caused by the flood to be the most serious short-
term issue. 
• The BRAC RDP/RCP program continues to grow in strength and 
complexity. With one exception (flood impact), the quality of the 
portfolio is strong and the system has effectively absorbed an 
additional Tk 7 U million over the last twelve months. 
• The serious exception is the impact of the August flood on ponfolio 
quality and BRAC's cash flow situation. It is likely that the impact 
of the flood will be to in.crease average loan size, increase the 
percentage of members that borrow, reduce member's abwty to save, 
and in some sectors significantly increase delinquency problems. 
Our initial assessment is that the most acute of the flood-rela.ted 
problems should work themselves out over the coming year, but there 
will be a residual impact thai may last for scvt:r.U yean.. Thll; 
assessment is tentative, for given the number of interacting variables 
the portfolio impact of the flood promises to be very complex. 
• While the flood affected 65% (1.23 million) BRAC borrowers, it will 
bave a disproportionately larger portfolio impact Looked at through 
a financial lens, 72% of the ponfolio is held by members in flood-
affected branches. Over the coming months, the impact of the flood 
will felt across a number of financial variables. Key projected 
changes are as follows: increased average loan size, increased 
delinquency, reduced weekly savings rate, increased savings 
withdrawals, and an increase in the percent of members that are 
borrowers. All of these forces will combine to create a "liquidity 
crunch" for BRAC during 1999. 
• BRAC has increased its loan Joss reserve to 5%, up from2%. Only 
68% of borrowers were current on loan payments during September 
and October. 
• Our estimate is that BRAC, as a whole will need between Tk1.3 and 
Tk2.4 billion to fill the anticipated loan and capital funding gap. Of 
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Loan Portfolio 
Growth 
Loan Portfolio 
Quality 
that total amount, RDP/RCP wjj] require between Tk600 and Tkl400 
million. 
• The BRAC portfolio has increased by Tk712 million over last ~elve­
months to Tk3.8 billion in June 1998 (a 23% increase). OvCOI!l 
growth is in line with internal targets across all brancheS. The 
percentage ofmem?ers who have taken a loan iB 10%.higher in. 
younger branches. Older branch performance is improved from last 
year but some older branches still need attention. Sector programs as 
.a percentage oftbe portfolio is flat at 24%, with activity increasing 
substantially only in tbe fisheries sector, followed by poultry. 
• There will be upward pressure on disbursement following !he flood 
as some members' refinance their businesses, the percentage of 
members that take out loans will increase, and som.e members with 
smaller outstandings will prepay in advance so as to get a larger new 
loan sooner. With savings deposits down and withdrawals up, BRAC 
will see increasing pressure on cash flow. 
• The plan is to increase BRAC members by 50% over the next live 
years (including RDP, rGVGD and Urban Lending) and to increase 
ourstandings by 20%-30% annually. 
• Pon:folio quality remained srrong until June 1998, with only a slight 
deterioration due to switch to biweekly pa)IJllent system. Loan 
quality was seriously affected by the flood, with September and 
October on time repayment dropping to 69% and 68% respectively. 
The sectors worst affected are poultry, fisheries and agriculrure. 
October's numbers show slight improvemenl Recovery will be 
slower !han non-cooperation period as many members lost a 
substantial amount of their entire asset base. 
• The loan loss provision bas been increased to 5% of disbursements 
because of the flood. Given what we know at this time relative to the 
impact of the floocl, we believe that reserves are more than adequate 
for 1998. BRAC wrote off all NIBL and overdue toms that bad 
been outstanding for three years for the first time ever in December 
1997. We believe write-offs should include all NIBL and 100 weeks 
overdue loans each year. This would bring the expected write-off for 
December 1998 to almost Tk30 million 
• Over 80% of branches have moved to biweekly meetings vs. 33% 
' last year. Members took time to adjust; hence there was a slight 
increase in delinquency. Weaker branches will continue to repay 
weekly to reinforce member discipline. 
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Loan Portfolio 
Management 
and Strategy 
Membership 
Trends 
Average Loan 
Size 
Member 
Savings 
Activities 
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• The portfolio needs an increased focus on economic impact and 
strategic leverage of loans to maximize poverty alleviation. MELA is 
still at the beginning of its learning curve, but has a plan to slowly 
increase strategic leverage during !999. 
I 
• The current system of loan categorization for RDP/RCP loans is 
outdated and in some cases so general as to be misleading, so it 
should be revised. Some categories (e.g., rural trading) are now such 
a large percentage of the portfolio (54%) that it needs to be 
subdivided so as to understand and manage ponfolio risk. 
• MELA and Urban Lending need to draw on RCP credit analysis and 
management systems more than at present 
• 20% annual growthnte, up 350,000 members from 1.8 million in 
June !997 to 2.2 million in JWJe 1998. Membership wl1J continue to 
· grow, but at a slower pace as BRAC will probably open fewer sub-
offices (outposts). MELA, Urban Lending and VGDmember growth 
is likely to be at a faster rate. 
• Average loan size is up by 9% (Tk4,137 to Tk4,5ll). Given 
inflation, this means that there has been essentially no growth in the 
real value of the average loan. Average loan size ofYearTwo 
branches at Tk2,500 indicates poorer households are being served. 
• The weekly savings rate declined by 7"/o to Tk4.62 weekly (or Tk9.24 
biweekly) per member between JWle 1997 and JWJe 1998. Given the 
shortage of data on the savings program, it is hard to determine 
causes. Th.is reduction may result from increases incostofliving, 
member difficulty to save Tkl 0 biweekly, and the increased intake of 
poorer (lGVGD) members who can only afford to contribute Jess. 
• Large pos.t flood withdrawals and lower weekly deposits will put 
continued downward pressure on the savings average during 1999, so 
this problem should get worse, not better. The overall tracking, 
management and future of the savings program is a serious cause for 
concern. 
• Growth in total net savings has slowed (up by 13% since December 
1997 vs. approximate 20% increase for same period last year). 
Savings growth in younger branches is tar stronger than older 
branches. 
• The resu.tts of the new savings pilot programs are inconclusive. Only 
ten percent of members have opened Current Account Savings. 
Savings products need additional research, development, staff 
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Branch 
P rofitab llity 
and 
SustainabiJity 
Special Donor 
Concerns 
Recommenda· 
tions 
support and marketing to achieve right pricing and maturity mix. 
• Given the importance of the savings program on a number of fronts, 
we recommend that BRAC create increased a dedicated head-office 
savings manager directing a team of savings POs (one per region). 
• In line with RDP ry plan. Strong profitability performance bas 
continued. Without the flood, we estimate that BRAC' s total 
RDP/RCP program (including sector costs) could have broken even 
by the year 2000. With the impact of the flood, break even will not 
happen until 2002 if sector program costs are included. Some older 
branches are still performing much Jess well than younger branches. 
• Sector program cost recovery is below RDP N targets. Service 
charges delinquency has increased by 6% over the past year. Costs 
per member in the sericulture program are very high relative to other 
programs and we continue to question the viability of this program. 
• BRAC trend TeJ)orts. Detail included in report. 
, 
• Computer introduction: Head-Office software bas been updated and a 
1 0-branch computerization pilot is in progress. Rollout is on track. 
Very important growth management strategy, needs to be finished as 
soon as possible, hopefully sooner than mid-2000. 
• VGD program. No financial or sustainability implic:ations for RDP. 
• Urban Lending Program: Doubled its membership to 38,000. Plan to 
increase membership to 150,000 within live years. Only 37% 
members to date have borrowed. 
• MFT.A program: Lending in 34 branches, just added 17 new branches 
in November. The goal is 100 branches by December 1999. 
Delinquency is low, for this remains a "high end YO-loan" program 
rather than a business enterprise lending program. Most lending is to 
businesses serving local, not export markets, and 1hus economic 
leverage is limited. ' 
• BRAC bank pronosaL Awaiting written authorization. 
• Head-Office Building Renavments: On track. 
• Refund of Group Trust Fund: On track, almost totally refunded. 
• Implementation of Shore bank Recommendations: Most inrroduced to 
some degree- detail in report 
• Shorebank bas made minor suggestions and major recolll!Illlildations 
throughout the report. Major recommendations are summarizes in 
ChapterS. 
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1. Opening Reflections: The Twin Challenges of 1999 
There are two major themes to be found throughout this 1998 Financial Review of 
BRAC's RDP/RCP programs: (a) the implications of the dcva~tating September 1998 
monsoon floods and (b) the continuing challenges of rapid growth management. Both are 
powerful ti1emes that will perhaps presen~ BRAC with some of the most difficult 
challenges in"its history. 
No Damage 
28% 
Damage 
16% 
Medium 
Damage 
18% 
Heavy 
38% 
While responding to the flood is a 
serious and immediate issue, in the 
long run it is the less serious of the two 
tasks. How BRAC responds to the 
challenges of scale and growth 
management over the coming several 
years wiU have a fundamental impact 
on its future. To make this issue even 
more important, because ofBRAC's 
intemationalleadership position in the 
field, how it responds to the challenges 
of scale and growth will likely affect 
tile future of tile microenterprise 
industry worldwide. 
We hope that this review will prove 
helpful to both BRAC Donors as well as BRAC Management GivenBRAC's long 
history of exceptional performance, we have full confidence that these challenges will be 
met successfully. 
One quick way to understand the 
scope and nature of these twin 
challenges is to examine two 
graphs. The first graph above shows 
how tile flood damage affected 
BRAC's loan portfolio, e.g., 38% of 
the total BRAC portfolio is held by 
borrowers that live in thanas that 
suffered heavy flood damage. More 
specifically, this implies that Tkl.8 
billion in loans are held by 
borrowers that suffered heavy flood 
damage. While the ultimate impact 
of the flood on the portfolio will 
take months to unfold, it is clear 
that it will have a serious portfolio 
impact. 
18118 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1985 1996 1987 Jun· 
98 
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The second graph visually shows BRAC continued asset base growth. The challenges of 
managing this rapid and continuous growth present BRAC's management structure with 
some of its most difficult challenges. BRAC comes by these issues naturally and these 
issues are not unique to BRAC. Just because it delivers an unusUal "product'' does not 
mean thatBRAC is immune to problems which plague rapidly growing companies. All 
rapidly growing companies, whether they produce computers or garments or issue 
microcredit, must \\'teStle with the issues of scale. Like all companies facing continuous 
and strong growth of this type, BRAC is facing signilicant stresses and strains in its cost 
structure, managemen~ control systems, employee productivity, and ability to manage an 
extensive set of ambitious programs. Unfortunately, the flood will only make this 
challenge more difficult 
Overall, there are four primary concerns that have surfaced in Shorebao.k's 1998 
Review: (a} funding1lood-driven loan demand; (b) effectively managing growth; (c) 
controlling the BRAC cost structure; and (d) strengthening the BRAC savings 
program. 
The good news is that until the flood, BRA.c's 1998 performance matched RDP N plans, 
sustainability levels were increasing, credit quality was good, and several initiatives 
ranging from MELA to the BRAC Bank proposal were moving forward. The bad news is 
that the flood has caused immense damage to the country and significant but as yet 
undefined damage to BRACs loan portfolio and members. While financial performance 
remains relatively strong, and at 9% the loan loss reserve is firm, there are still many 
unanswered questions about how 1999 will play out 
As is so often the case in situations like this, the most troubling issues are like tectonic 
faults, hidden in what appears lo be a solid surface of the earth. The exact nature and 
severity of these earthquake fault lines is unknown, for !hey are not easily seen. 
Aside from the obvious problems caused by flood, the most disturbing issues raised 
during this review have to do with BRAC's ability to continue to manage the rapid 
growth that it has seen since the early 1990's. In many ways, BRAC's management 
structure, management systems, and system wide program architecture are still more 
suited to a company with Tk 1 billion in assets, rather than the reality of a company with 
Tk6 billion in assets handling over a million transactions a week It is always easier to 
grow assets and hire more employees than it is to renew and develop more capable 
management systems, capacities and personneL All too often. companies do not survive 
such a rapid growth pace because the company is so preoccupied with the constant 
struggle to cope with the pressures of cC)nstant growth that it is unable to and engage in 
the constant self-improvement that is necessary to survive. 
Let us be very clear. Our intent is not to be critical or to cast doubt on BRAC 
Management. Quite the opposite is true. In fact this "problem" is the result ofBRAC's 
success and growth, not its failure. It is a testament to !he strength and competence of 
BRAC's management that BRAC has done as well as it has, in spite of its extraordinary 
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pace of rapid growth. However, as BRAC management and the group of Donors looks 
forward to 2000 and beyond, these less immediately visible, underlying stresses of rnpid 
growth are increasing and must receive signjficant a.ttention, not just "fine tuning." 
Our intent is to state explicitly that this is a very serious issue facing BRAC. Now is the 
time to focus on it and begin to m~e the complex and systemic changes that will aJ low 
BRAC to support continued growth over the corning decade. The time to address these 
issues is not }'then the system begins to "break", but before that point. That time is now. 
Sector Exp 
Operating Exp 
Salaries 
Membership 
Total Portfolio 
0% 10% 20% 
34% 
June 1997 to 
June 1998 
Pe rcent -.;n.an!l81 
by Category 
30% 40% 
The graph above is just one of many examples of how the stresses of growth are 
beginning to appear. A classic symptom of rapid company growth is escalating cosiS. 
This graph shows that operating and salary costs increased by 34%, while membership 
arul the loan portfolio increased by only 23%. As BRAC obtains the benefits of 
economies of scale, the reverse should be trUe: its costs should be increasing at a rate 
substantially less than its asset base and membership. 
The diagnosis of this and other "Growth Management" issues facing BRAC and the 
development of a plan of response are well beyond the scope of this brief three-week 
Financial Review. We make no claim that this review offers anything like the 
comprehensive analysis that must be done to understarul and respond to these issues. We 
do, however, recommend in the strongest terms possible that BRAC set up a permanent, 
well connected, multi-department "Growth Management" Task Force (involving people 
inside and outside ofBRAC) and give the support of Senior Management 
As always, we thoroughly enjoyed working with BRAC employees, the Donors and the 
DLO Office during the course of this Review. For your conYenience, we have: included a 
chapter at the back of this document that summarizes our recommendations. 
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2. Impact Of the Flood and Funding Requirements 
2.1 Total BRAC Funding Summary 
A number of expected and unexpected forces will create a need for additional BRAC 
capital funds during 1999. The expected forces are positive: continuing membership and 
lending growth and the expansion of specific targeted programs (e.g., MELA and Urban 
Lending). The unexpected forces are negative: a decrease in the average per member 
savings amount and the damaging August-September monsoon floods. 
Even though each of these factors are quite ~istinct., they all reinforce each other in 
creating a "liquidity crunch" for BRAC. There are actually two types of Joan capital 
need.ed. The first type is "internal" capital needed to keep the current BRAC financial 
and capital situation healthy (primarily to cover flood related loan losses, loss of interest 
income, and flood related mandatory loan refinancing). The second type is "external" 
loan capital necessary to enable BRAC to say "Yes" to new or additional loan demand 
from existing and new members. As was discussed at the December 7, 1998 Donor 
meeting, BRAC can always say "No" to new, "external" demand for loans should it not 
have sufficient funds. 
MELA 
UOP 
PLOP 
IGVGD 
RCP 
RDP 
0 200 400 
Estimated BRAC 1999 
Loan Capital and Funding 
Requirements 
Three Case Analysis 
637 
1,059 
0 Best Case (Tk 1.354) 
• Medium Case (Tk1,795) 
o Worst Case (Tk2A36) 
600 BOO 1,000 
Million Taka 
1.200 
At this point., it is too ~ly to determine the exact amount and timing of the need for 
additional loan funds, but we have nonetheless attempted to estimate capital needs. As 
suggested by the graph above, based on a "medium case" ofloan demand, BRAC 
RDP/RCP will require a total of about Tk950 million or US $20 million will be needed to 
Page II 
support flood recovery and program growth for the BRAC RDPIRCP programs. Beyond 
RDPIRCP, an additional Tk800 million will be needed over the coming year to support 
the continuation of other BRAC loan programs. 
Some of these funds will be needed relatively quickly, during the coming si..'< months, as 
BRAC members work to recover from the flood damage. Other funds will be needed at a 
more steady pace over the coming 12 months, to support the steady program and lending 
growth of existing and emerging BRAC lending programs. 
Any analysis is only as good as th.e underlying assumptions. The assumptions for the 
projected BRAC funding gap are listed in Lhe table below. The most powerful factor is 
average Joan size, followed by the percent of members that are borrowers. Should some 
indicators get "better" (e.g., average loan size does not increase at the rate projected or 
savings withdrawals do not increase at the projected rate), then the funding gap will be 
less. On the other hand, should some key variable get "worse" (e.g., weekly savings rate 
drops even more), then the funding gap will be greater. 
BRAC Funding Analysis Key Assumptions 
Pre-Flood Bast Case Medium Case Worst Case 
RDP Average Loan Size Tk3.400 Tk5.500 Tk5,800 Tk5,900 
RCP Average Loan Size Tk4,900 Tk5,900 Tk6.000 Tk6.100 
%of Members That Borrow 70% 76% n% 80% 
Loan Loss Reserve 2.0% 3.0% 3 .5% 4 .0% 
Savings Withdrawal Rate 0% 20% 23% 25% 
Weekly Savings Rate Tk4.6 Tk4.1 Tk3.6 Tk3.0 
2.2 Possible flood and funding impact indicators 
To avoid over-lending or even creating a capital deficit, BRAC needs to devise a set of 
indicators that will help it to forecast and manage its funding needs, as well as to assess 
the impact of the flood on credit, savings and sector programs. BRAC's accounting 
department now has a model to help it monitor the funding needs arising from the flood. 
To use the model, the following information should be supplied to BRAC monthly from 
all branches on as frequent and timely a basis as humanly possible. 
Total Number of members (affects savings and indicates potential future loan 
demand) 
Percent of members who are borrowers (affects disbursements) 
Number of new members (projects level of furure disbursements) 
Number of of dtop outs (impacts member motivation, savings wilhdrawal, and 
repayment) 
Membership at the end of the current month (use for forecasting funding need) 
Total disbursement during the month 
Number of borrowers requesting new loans 
Page l2 
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Number of borrowers requesting refinanced loans 
Total Taka refinanced 
Number of new loans disbursed 
average size of all loan requested during current month (all loans including 
refinancing loans) 
On time repayment (including arrears and advances, paying off arrears and advances 
usually means thai a new, larger loanrequest is coming) 
Orl'time repayment (excluding arrears"and advances) 
Percent of members that made all payments during the month 
Percent of members that made no payments during the month - indicates possible 
future losses 
APO: percent borrowers with zero past due, 1-4 payments missed, 5-12 payments 
missed; 13-25 payments missed; over 25 payments missed; (indicates money 
available lo finance future disbursements) 
Percent of active savers (made at least one savings deposit during the month) 
Average biweekly savings rate/ member 
average net savings per branch (all savings deposits- savings withdrawals) 
Number of members in each of the sector programs 
Percent of realized I % due (based on activity, not targets) for each of sector 
programs. 
2.3 Estimated portfolio quality impact of the flood 
The flood affected over fifty percent ofBRAC' s branches. Of those affected, VO 
members living in 120 areas were badly to moderately affected. The flood had three 
immediate financial impacts: decreased savings deposits, increased savings ·withdrawals 
and decreased on-time repayments ofloans. On time repayments (OTR) excluding 
advances dropped significantly from June 1998 levels in August (down 22%), September 
(down 37%) and October(down 21%). 
It is still too early to say whether the improvement in October' s numbers will continue in 
the months ahead. We are sure, though, that the recovery will o~cur at a far slower pace 
than the six-momh recovery ofBRAC' s portfolio after the non-cooperation period in 
early 1996. This is because most households did not lose their assets during the non-
cooperation period, they just lost business opportunities. The flood. however. has wiped 
out the asset base of a large nurnber ofBRAC borrowers. This will put downward 
pressure on ihe pace of the recovery. 
Percent of Members with On Time Repayment (OTR for ROP+RCP+VGD) 
Juno 98 (pre-flood) 
Au:ust 98 
September 98 
October 98 
[ncJ. Acceus +Advances £sclude. Advances Exclude Arrears+ 
122% 
92% 
73% 
94% 
99.6% 
78% 
62% 
77% 
Advances 
92% 
77% 
61% 
74% 
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The aging of the portfolio for September 1998 (mcluding VGD branches) showed that the 
flood impact was uneven across sectors. Overall, only 68% of the portfolio was 100% 
current. The sectors most affected were cottage industry, sericulrure, poultry and 
livestock, and housing. Even though rural trading's 100% current portfolio share was 
72% (vs. over 90% in June), the fact that it comprises over 50% of the entire portfolio 
means that there will be a substantial effect if those borrowers do not recover. The 
impact on agriculture's borrowers was partially insulated, as most maize borrowers had 
not begun their crop planting. Vegetable growers, however, were severely affected. 
# Members that made all avmeots #Members thllt missed all avmenrs 
June 98 (pre-fiood} 
August 98 
September 98 
October 98 
1,552,436 
1,287,778 
1,016,.227 
1,236,333 
93,667 
144,583 
453,124 
304,922 
BRAC's strategy to deal with flood-affected areas bas been four-fold: 
• Supplying emergency relief and replacement of stock for those most severely 
affected. The relief is financed from outside the RDP budget 
• Allowing members to withdraw up to 50% of their savings 
• Allowing members to refinance their business up to 50% of the previous loan amount 
that they received. This will put upward pressure on disbursements over the next six 
months 
• Allowing members who have a good repayment history to pay off the balance of !.heir 
outstanding loan in advance, so that they can receive a larger new loan. This will also 
put upward pressure on disbursements. 
3. Portfolio Risk Management and Credit Related Activities 
3.1 Portfolio Analysis Summary 
,h1 Port1ollo Outnandlng By Branch~· (000) Jun• 1e9 
Tk:&CO,OOO 
l"'OO,OCO 
Tlt100.001) 
T~O +-"'-'="'"-""'-"'lt:..,ll"'-"" 
- - - - ~ - ~ - -2 :s. • s & 7 • ' 10 
In spite of continued strong growth (June 97 to June 98 growth rate of23%), BRAC's 
portfolio quality is strong, and credit management continues to be a focus for branch_ 
managers. While there are "soft spots" in certain sectors (fisheries and food processmg) 
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and within some older branches (Year II .and 13 branches),l'ortfolio perfonnance overall 
is strong, especially given its size (Tk3.8 billion in June 1998). The 1% increase in NIBL 
is a full point lower than the increase we reported on last year, and problems in year 12 
branches have been largely resolved. 
From a Donor/iinancial management perspective, we see no major problems looming in 
BRAC's loan portfolio, with the exception of the impact of the flood. From a BRAC 
Management perspective, we see potential to improve the performance in some of the 11 
and 1"3 year branches, as was done in the case ofY ear 12 branches over the past year. 
We also see the need for BRAC to develop a deeper understanding ofbigber risk sectors 
(fisheries, food processing, sericulture and housing), and sectors where the ponfolio has 
become concentrated (e.g. in rural trading and food processing). 
3.2 Implications of changes In disbursements, outstanding, and loan size 
Sectorwlse Olstribu.llon of Principal Outstanding (ROP + RCP) 
Jun-96 Jun-97 Jun-98 
Sector CIS % TPO Sector as % T?O Sector as % TPO 
All Sectors 100% 1 00% 100% 
Agriculture 11% 10% g% 
Irrigation 0% 0% Oo/o 
Baor 1% 1% 1% 
Asherias 5% 6% 6% 
Livestock and Poultry 9% 8% 8% 
Sericulture 1% 0% 0% 
Cottage Industry 2% 1% 1% 
Services 0% 0% 0% 
Rural Transport 3% 3% 2% 
Rural Trading 43% 50% 54% 
Food Processing 18% 16% 12% 
Health 0% 0% 0% 
Miscellaneous 1% 1% 4% 
Housing So/o 4"/o 3% 
Tolal principal outstanding (TPO) increased 23% from Tid billion in June 1997 to Tk3.8 
billion June 1997.1 This compares wnh a 26% rise in TPO from·June 1996 to June 1997 
and a 34% increase from June 1995 to June 1996. BRAC devoted ·significant staff tune 
over the past two years to opening new branches and outposts and increasing its 
membership reach (see graph). These 
efforts are likely to translate into an 
increased rate of ponfolio growth 
going forward. The refinancing of a 
Growth In Number of ROP and RCP 
Branches and Outposts 
portion ofBRAC's portfolio (estimated 300 +--- ---- -l 
at around 20% of members in flood 
affected areas) will put further upward 
pressure on outstandings over the next 
year. 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
Jun·&S Jun·116 Jun·97 Jun-98 
Except for the Rural Trading (up 4%) and Food Processing sectors {down 4%), there 
were few striking changes in the value of each sector as a proportion ofTPO. The 
increase in outstandings is due both to a rise in the number ofloans disbursed as well as 
an increase in the average loan size. The real value of the average loan size increased 
iKS.OOO ,--f<G~r~o~w~thhi.rn;AA;ve;ra~g;eLL~o~a~n~S~I;ze;[D~u;elt~olrn~fl;.a~Uko~n:J-- ------, 
and ou'~ to 'Roal Growth' , 
ilc1,000 
1989 1990 1991 1992 19113 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
-ilc1,000 L_ _ _______________ _______ ___: 
between 1% and 2%' over the past year. The average Loan size increased from Tk4100 to 
Tk4500 - a I 0% increase vs. an inflation rate increase of between 7% and 10% over the 
past year. It is interesting to note that the "original" 1989 BRAC first loan amount of 
Tkl600 would in 1998 be inflation adjusted to be Tk2400. 
The term mix remained relatively unchanged. 99% ofBRAC's portfolio (excluding 
MELA) has a loan term of one year. This was a deliberate strategy by BRAC to improve 
the quality of its portfolio after managers of the credit program discovered a high 
correlation between the term of the loan and borrower delinquency due to deteriorating 
member discipline. 
All Sectors 
Agriculture 
Irrigation 
Baor 
Fisheries 
Livestock and Poultry 
Sericulture 
Cottage Industry 
Services 
Rural Transport 
Rural Trading 
Food Processing 
Health 
Miscellaneous 
Housing 
% No Pmts 
Missed.June 97 
87% 
89% 
40% 
77% 
76% 
85% 
57% 
94% 
92% 
91% 
g1o/o 
82% 
96% 
84% 
54% 
% No Pmts Missed.June 
98 (after write-off of Dec 
1997 
90% 
92% 
80% 
79% 
88% 
92% 
71% 
88% 
93% 
93% 
93% 
86% 
97% 
80% 
67% 
Impact ofBjweekly Meeting Schedule Change. 
% Missed 4-25 
Payments June 98 
5% 
7% 
12% 
19% 
7% 
7% 
8% 
11% 
7% 
7% 
7% 
12% 
3% 
17% 
14% 
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In early 1996 BRAC experimented with monthly VO meetings in fiTSt year branches 
instead of weekly meetings. BRAC found that although delinquency did not deteriorate 
significantly, there were at least two notable impacts: 
• A portion of members found it difficult to pay a single, large monthly instaUment. In 
other words, they found it easier to manage their cash flow on a weekly basis. This 
put a little downward pressure on the size of loans disbursed, and hence, the amount 
of interest income earned. 
• BRAC field staff and borrowers found that member discipline and stalf-borrower-
inleraction suffered slightly as a result of the change from weekly to monthly 
meetings. 
By the third quarter of 1997, BRAC changed meeting frequency to biweekly meetings for 
all first and second year branches (i.e. two meetings a month). By December !998, 300 
out of330 branches are using the biweekly meeting structure. During the period of 
transition to biweekly meetings, there was a substantial increase in delinquency (e.g., no 
payments missed dropped to 80% in June 1997 from 87% the prevjous month). The 
portfolio recovered quickly as members adapted to the larger biweekly installments that 
were due. Overall, there was a 1% decline in the quality of the ponfolio outstanding 
between June 97 and June 98. If not for the write-offs in December 1997. the no-
payments missed category, which currently displays 90%, would be 86% (vs. 87% a year 
earlier). 
Branches where member discipline is poor are nor encouraged to change their weekly 
repaymenl system. The decision as to which branches should be on the biweekly system 
is left up to the branch and regional manager. This is in line with BRAe's objective of 
gtving branches and regions more authority to make their own decisions. 
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As a result of the shift to biweekly meetings, some PAs have more free time to do other 
work. More staff time will be freed up once bnlncbes receive their computers. We feel 
strongly that a directive should come from head-o.ffice as to what additional performance 
is expected from PAs. As we mentioned last year, we think that a much more serious 
savings mobilization effort would be an effective use of their time. 
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Suggestions Related To Disbursements, l oan Size, And Term Mix 
I . BRAC should track the median first Joan size of all borrowers. A small percentage o f 
borrowers rece.iving a first loan ofTk2000 or less may indicate that poorer members 
are oot being adequately reached. BRAC should also continu.e to monitor both the 
numberofVOs and the average VO size to keep traokofnewmember growth. 
2. Branch managers in branches with very few past due loans should slowly begin to 
allow sligbrly longer loan terms to selected borrowers who have proved themselves 
able to handle larger loans over longer terms (say 1.5 to 2 years). The general rule of 
"one year loan terms only, " however, sbould continue to exist. 
3. PA staff should become savings mobilizers as part of their current job until an 
alternative staffing arrangement is in place. The shift to bi-weekly meetings should 
free up some time, as should the shift to ·thenew system of exception only reporting. 
4. VOs, where delinquency has increased noticeably since the switch to biweekly 
meetings should either switch back to weekly meetings, or give specific training to 
members to assist them manage an increased cash flow. 
5. Branch staff should be asked to investigate the slow rate of outstandings growth in 
Year ll branches and the "n<.> growth" in Year 13 branches. 
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3.3 Changes in sector portfolio outstanding 
The total principal outstanding (TPO) inBRAC's four sector programs (agriculture, 
poultry and livestock, fish,eries and sericulture) totaled 24% of the total loan portfolio in 
Juoe 1998. The RDP IV Plan target is 25% ofTPO, a target reachedin 1995 and 1996 . 
• 
10000 
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BRAC intends to increase its portfolio in fisheries, livestock/poultry and agriculture in 
the years ahead. This is because the net-profit for members operating in th.ese sectors is 
significantly higher than many alternative options. For example, the average income a 
poor rural household earns is Tk 12,000. A vegetable grower or chick rearer can increase 
their household income by an additional 80% (Tkl 0,000) a year. The largest long-term 
opportunities for growth are probably in the poultry and livestock program as agriculrure 
and fisheries need land, which is not easily available, and sericulturc to date has not 
proved economically viable for either members or BRAC. 
The percentage ofTPO that the sector programs occupy uoderstates the number of 
members who are benefiting from !he sector programs. For example, the average loan 
required by poultry rearers is only Tk1 ,500 compared with a Tk4,590 average loan for all 
sectors. 
All Sectors 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Sericulture 
Poultry and 
Livestock 
-
% increase in 
size of sectors: 
June 97-98 
23% 
II 
32 
-22 
20 
Sector's % of 
TPO in June 
1998 
24% 
9% 
7% 
0% 
8% 
Goat rearers also take a 
relatively smaller s1ze loan 
(Tk3000) and sericulture rearers 
often do not require repeat loans 
to continue operating in the 
sector. Around 24% (493,944) 
of all BRAC RDP members are 
involved in Poultry. 
Approximately 7% of members 
own livestock (cows and goats), 
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7% are in fisheries, and 5% are in agriculture. Less than 1% of members are involved in 
sericulture. In the June 1997 - June 1998 period, only the fisheries portfolio, which 
grew 32%, increased at a faster rate than the average for all sectors, which grew at 23%. 
Agriculture. Members in this sector 
totaled 84,160 in June 1997 vs. 61,124 Agriculture as a Percent of 
in June 1998 (excluding around 20,000 15% ~-----------..1..----, 
- 30,000 maize producers). Income 
generation for members in this sector 
is hindered by the availability ofhigh 
quality seeds and suitable land. 
BRAC's shift into Maize production 
which can be grown in poor soils (e.g. 
10% 
'• 
5% 
0% 
June '96 June '97 June '98 
in North Bengal), and its seed production center, which produces and distributes high 
quality seeds, are helping to alleviate these problems. The land constraint is being 
addressed though approaching landowners and asking them to lease a piece of their land 
to VO members. C,urrently, 90% of fanners own their land and 10% lease. We can 
expect this sector to slowly grow its number of members. with the percentage of 
members that lease land increasing proportionately. 
Flood Impact oo Agriculrure (see projections later). Over eighty percent of the 
61,000 vegetable growers. who make up 60% of the agriculrural sector, were ver:y bard 
hit by the flood. At least 50% of these farmers suffered serious losses. Luckily, maize 
growers who make up the other 40% had not yet planted their crops and thus escaped 
relatively unscathed. Since most crops have a two-month cycle, the head of the sector 
expects a substantial degree of recovery by the end of December 1998. He expects 15% 
of those worst affected to want to refinance their Joan. 
Fisheries. The fisheries sector increased its members from 141,253 in 1997 to 152,727 in 
!998. BRAC is managing to expand this sector by leasing land with ponds, rehabilita.ting 
unused ponds, intensifying its use of existing ponds (e.g. carp and prawn polyculture 
8.00% Fisllrils !:etta 
7
·00% as a % d 1PO 
1.00% 
~00% +-~~~+-~~~+-~ 
Jtre '96 
grow in the same pond) and by making 
loans to four to five VO members who 
collectively manage ponds larger than 1/3 
acre. We expect positive growth of 
members to continue in the fisheries sector. 
However, a SUStained increase in the 
fisheries sector as a proportion of TPO is 
limited for as long as !he availability of 
ponds remains scarce. 
Flood Impact on Fisheries (see 
projections later). Fisheries were very bard hit by the flood. Thirty percent 9f ponds 
experienced serious physical damage and an additional20% had moderate damage. 
Eighty percent of fingerlings escaped. Most farmers lost their entire stock, as well as the 
investment they had made in digging and preparing the pond. Since pond stocking takes 
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place in April I May, and harvesting starts in July August, it will take at least six months 
to nine months before there is significant recovery among these farmers. 
Poultry and Livestock. An additional30,000 members joined BRAC's poultry sector 
and an additional 10,000 women participated in BRAC's livestock sector over the"J)ast 
year. The stated value of the poultry portfolio is underestimated because members who 
want to buy poultry know that BRAC staff will only make them one loan of around 
TI<ISOO. Many members want a larger loan to increase their flexibility and income 
options. As a result, they tell BRAC PAs that they want a rural trading loan of Tk3,000 -
4,000. They then purchase poultry for Tkl,SOO and use the balance for rural trading. 
This type of outcome is unavoidable for as long as BRAC staffs discourage members to 
take out more than one Joan. 
Livestock and Poultry 
4.00% 
2.00% 
June '96 June '97 June '98 
F lood Impact on P oultry and 
Livestock (see projections later). 
The head of the poultry sector 
estimates that 310 out of380 
branches (including the 50 VGD 
branches) were very badly affected 
by the flood The houses for the 
poultry were destroyed, as was a 
large proportion ofthe stock which 
members did not manage to sell on 
time. The market was flooded with chickens and hence the price per chick or hen was 
very low at the time of sales. He believes that 50% to 55% of members affected will ask 
for a refinancing loan. The head of the livestock sector estimates thai although BRAC 
may recover most its losses within one year, it will take members two or more years to 
make up their losses as livestock, especially cows, are a very expensive to replace. 
Serlculture. The sericulture portfolio as a percent ofTPO continued to decline . There 
are roughly the same number of members now (i.e. 24,000) as there were in 1997. 
The reason for the latest decline in the sericulture portfolio is partially a result of a 
strlllegic decision by BRAC to s low down the growth of the sericulture program until a 
thorough evaluation is done in early 1999. 
We strongly agree with this decision, and are 
skeptical of the viability and economic 
impact of the sericulture sector. 
0.40'Yo 
0.30'Yo 
0.20'Yo 
Impact of Flood on Sericulture (see 
p roj ections later). Between 60o/o-70% of 
all mulberry trees and bushes were destroyed 0·10% 0.00% +--..~.:!!~__,.---~;: 
by the flood. Over 60% of members lost a June ·ss June '97 
significant portion of their crop and suffered . 
June '98 
damage to their rearing houses. The heads of the sericulture expect a 25% drop in 
membership and less.Disease Free Larva to be available to existing members. They 
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estimate it will take the sector three years to recover till the trees and bushes get back to 
their former levels. 
Other Comments 
BRAC has strengthened its management of the sector prograpl.S by transferring two of 
RDP's top regional managers to head up the Poultry and Livestock portfolios. AU four of 
the largest sector programs now have very strong managers who have sound. operational 
experience.· BRAC head-office needs to develop systems that will allow them to track 
the flows of inputs into the branches as well as cash flows from members to the branches, 
and from the branches back to the head-office. 
Recommendations: sector programs 
l. We suggest thatBRAC set new targets for its sector program coverage, which 
systematically underestimate achievements. This is important for forecasting inputs, 
cost recovery from service charges as well as for motivating staff to increase their 
performance. • 
2. We recommend an extensive evaluation ofBRAC's sericulture program, the impact 
of sericulture on borrowers relative to other sectors, reasons behind the delinquency 
in the sericulture portfolio and the impacr of external forces (e.g. government lifting 
the tariff on imports). 
3.4 Delinquency in the loan portfolio 
Before analyzing BRAC's portfolio it is worth documenting how BRAC managed to 
decrease delinquency in some of its older branches (mainly last 1997's Year 11 
branches). BRAC began what it calls a rebuilding strategy where non-performing VOs 
(i.e. VOs that have 
18.0% many inactive 
16.0% members and high 
14.0% past-dues) are 
12.0% "weeded out". BRAC 
10.0% has found that a lack 
6.0% of borrower discipline 
6.0% in poorly performing 
4.0'4 branches is 
2.0'/o contagious. 
0.0% 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1995 1997 Jtn-98 To prevent "good 
borrowers" from 
becoming credit risks, BRAC's "rebuilding strategy" builds up a new, well functioning 
VO in the same area, moves across the "disciplined members" from the deteriorating VO. 
BRAC introduced this system at some of its 37 highly problematic branches where 
borrower discipline, particularly in some VOs had deteriorated substantially. The result: 
decreased delinquency and an increase in the dropout rate of inactive members. Another 
factor contributing the decrease in delinquency among some older branches and the 
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increased drop-out rate is the fact that all members' whose debt was written off at then 
end of 1997 were (finally) categorized as inactive, and their outstanding debt was taken 
off the books. 
In our analysis of loan portfolio delinquency, we follow a three-step process: 
l. Identify the sectorwise distribution of principal outstanding to see how large each 
sector is relative to the size of the loan portfolio. 
2. F. valuate the trends in each aging category of missed payments. 
3. Identify those sectors that have the greatest amount principal outstanding that are 
seriously behind in payments (i.e. more than 26 payments past due). 
Step I: Distribution of Principal By Sector. 
Over the past year, rural trading, as a proportion ofTPO increased an additional 4%. 
Over the past three years this sector has grown 19%. The latest increase is particularly 
striking because rural trading already occupied 50% ofTPO in June 1997. It now 
occupies 54% ofBRAC's credit portfolio. 
Although rural trading has a disproportionately low share of risky loans, the total Taka 
value of risky loans in this sector is large due to its sheer size as a proportion ofTPO. As 
mentioned in last year's report, we tl)ink it is important to separate out larger sub-sectors 
within rural trading for at least two reasons to assess their risk profile. 
BRAC should acknowledge that the rural 
trading loan category is becoming a 
"catch all" category that is becoming less 
and less useful as a management and 
portfolio analysis category. BRAC 
should rebalance its sysrem of loan 
categories and (a) create addirional sector 
divisions that are more accurate and 
revealing of the acmal use of the loan, 
and (b) to avoid proliferation of sector 
categories, it should combme some very 
low use sectors into combined categories. 
In general, BRAC should carefully track 
loan categories that exceed l 0% of the 
value of the total loan ponfolio for risk 
management purposes. 
Food 
Proeosslng 
12% 
Rur•l Trading 
53 'Yo 
Other 
11% 
Agru:ulture 
9% 
Fisheries 
7~. 
8'!. 
Sec:tors Share of 
Portfolio (June 1998) 
Apart from rural trading. the only other sector that registered an increase in size as a 
ponion ofTPO was the ~ellaneous 'sector' (up 3%) which is impossible to analyze 
due to the vagueness as to what is contamed in this category. Food processing, the 
second largest sector, registered a 4% decline. This means that there was a substantial 
drop in the number ofborrowers, which was accentuated by the fact that food-processing 
loans are often relatively small. BRAC may want to investigate the reasons underpinning 
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the decline so as to know which parts of the food processing business was not lucrative 
for borrowers. This is important as food processing has a disproportionately higlt risk. 
Housing sector TPO declined as a proportion ofTPO, the housing sector has sbrunk to 
3% ofTPO vs. 8% in 1 ~95 to 4% in 1997. The reduction in housing loans stems from a 
management decision not to grant housing loans given their disproportionately high risk 
historically. 
Step 2: Reviewing APO Trends. 
Aging of principal outstanding 
(APO) enables BRAC to ascertain 
what the trends of repayment are in 
the various sectors. In the APO 
tra.ck:ing system, if a borrower 
misses a payment, the entire 
principal amount of the loan shows 
up as "past due." :rhis method 
allows BRAC to monitor how much 
of the portfolio is at risk at any one 
time with clear categories of the 
degree of risk. 
We believe that the "no payments 
missed" category across sectors (see 
table earlier) is an excellent 
indicator of where repayment 
problems are likely to occur down 
Agrloulturo 
10'!. 
FJ.Sheries 
19'l'o 
Other 
11•!. 
Uves·toc.k•Poultry 
9% 
Non·lntortlsl Bearing Loans 
June 1998 
Rural Trading 
24'1'. 
the line. Borrowers that have missed payments in the past are more Likely to miss 
payments in the furure.2 
Pa ents Missed Jun-93 Jun-94 Jun-95 Jun-97 Jun-98 
No Payments Missed 70% 84% 87% 87% 90% 
1-4 payments 7% 4% 4% 4% 5% 
5-12 payments 5% 3% 3% 2% 2% 
13·25 payments 5~~ 3% 2% 2% 1% 1% 
26-50 payments 7% 3% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
over 50 payments 5% 4o/o 3% 5% 1% 6% 
Payments Missed 29% 17% 13% 13% 10% 100% 
BRAC's overall portfolio has remained strong in line with its performance since June 
1995. There has been a slight deterioration in the no payments missed category. 
Fisheries, sericulture, housing lllld food processing continue to be higher risk sectors. 
Step 3: Assessing the Concentration ofRis.k/Delinquency in the LoaD Portfolio. 
The next step is to compare the concentration of sectors with the slowest repayment with 
their overall proportion in the loan portfolio. For example, if irrigation bas a high 
percent of slow repaying loans but is Jess that 0.5% ofTPO, the problem is less 
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worrisome than if a sector like fisheries which is 7% ofTPO bas many delinquent 
borrowers. 
A B c D 
(Note: Risky Lo:lllS are Wlut % of eocb What %of % of loW risky % of loW risky 
defined as> 26 sector are risk-y each sector are loans that loans that sector 
payments missed plus loans (6198) risky loans sec! or occupies oeeupies (6/97) 
allNIBL) 6/97) 6198 
Agriculture 1% 5% 6% 8% 
lrrlgafioo B% 54% 0% 2%-
Baor 2% 12% 1% 1% 
Fisheries 5% 10% 15% 10% 
Livest<>ck & Poultry 1% 8% 5% 11% 
Serieulture 21% 26% 3% 2% 
Cottage.Industry 1% 5% 0% l% 
Services 1% 4% 0% 0% 
Rural Transport 1% 4% 1% 2% 
Rural Trading 1% 3% 20% 24% 
Food Processing 2% 7% 16% 17% 
Health 0% 1% 0% 0% 
Miscellaneous 2% 9% 5% i% 
Housing 19% 30% 28% 18% 
Total l n All Sectors 2% 6% 100% 100% 
Column A ignores the proportion of the portfolio that lbe sector occupies and merely 
shows how much of the panicular sector' s portfolio is risky. We can see that sericulture 
has the biggest chunk of risky loans in its portfolio compared with other sectors. Housing 
also has a fifth of its portfolio in the "high risk" category. We can see though, that the 
position improved dramatically for housing and irrigation over the past year (compare A 
vs. B above). This is because many of these loans, which should have been written off a 
several years ago, were finally 
written off at the end of 1997. 
Ten percent of the fisheries 
portfolio and etght percent of the 
poultry and livestock portfolio is 
in the "high risk" category. 
Column C shows the four sectors 
that make up over 60% of the 
risky loans in the ponfolio 
(housing, food processmg, 
fisheries, and rural trading). We 
expect rural trading to house a 
large chunk of risky loans given 
that 54% of the total porrfolio is in 
this sector. However, the same is 
not true for fisheries, housing or 
food-processing which all have a 
substantially higher percentage of 
Concentration of RCP and RDP Risky Loans 
(June 1998) 
Other Rural Trading 
20•1. 
Food Pro~:es.sjng 
1G% 
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risky loans lhan their respective weights in the loan po.rtfolio. Wbile the proportion of 
risky loans has declined in both the poultry/livestock and agriculture sectors over the past 
year, the position of fisheries and sericulture have deteriorated further. We feel strongly 
that BRAC should examine the causes of delinquency in these sectors if it intends to 
reduce losses in the future. 
Recommendations 
1. Because BRAC is deliberately targeting its sector programs, a study of the reasons for 
delinquency in the ftSheries and sericul!Ufe is necessary. A study will reveal whether 
poor loan decisions were made by BRAC staff, or whether there is something 
inherent in the structuring of the lo.ans or the nature of the sector that causes 
delinquency. 
2. As eXplained earlier, both rural trading at 54% ofTPO and food processing at 12% of 
TPO need to be refined and split out into. more accurate and meaningful categories 
that support analysis as to the cause of delinquencies . 
. 
3. Since 18 percent of the housing portfolio is considered high risk (i.e. over 26 
payments missed), continued branch level caution in disbursing housing loans 
appears to be warranted. 
4. BRA.C should pUl all NIBL loans into the 100 weeks missed category in its APO 
report and should continue to write off all NIBL loans and all loans that are two years 
past due (at most three years) as it did in December 1997. 
3.5 Adequacy of Loan Loss Reserve 
In summary, the following analysis shows that the BRAC Loan Loss Reserve is more 
than adequate, subject to the possibility thatlhe impact of the flood will be greater than 
projected at this point. 
Tier 1: Non-Accrual Loans (June 1998) =Identified likely uncollectahles 
100% ofNIBL 
I 00% ofloans >I 00 wk. past due 
50% of loans >50-I 00 wk. past due 
Sub total 
Tk20.4 million 
Tk2.9 million 
Tk8.0 million 
Tk3l.3 million3 
Tier 2: Doubtful Loans (accrual status)= Unidentified estimated uncollectables of 
loans estimated at 3 % of current loans outstanding (excluding NlBL and 
overdues past 50 weeks as at June 1998) =1kll3 million' 
Based on this analysis, the total estimated satisfactory loan loss reserve for June 1998 is 
Tkl44 million (including VGD as at September it is Tkl75 million). Fortunately, the 
actual loan loss reserve as of June 1998 from the RCP & RDP balance sheets is Uc287 
million, or almost 200% of the necessary loan loss reserve. : 
In September a further 5% of disbursement provision was made because of the flood 
bring the total to Tk456 million. Even including the 50 VGD branches, a safe 
provisioning for September 18 would only require a reserve ofTki7S million. 
Provisioning is thus more than adequate. 
, .. · L ·-R~ - ~v--r:-w;;.-i*t'": ·-:r ~~~ .. ..---Recommendations: Loan oss eserve ·tJ '" J • ""!;"' ""'~,- .: .. -
- t"'Y. ~ • ..,. t _ .. _.,_ 
.,.·- - .. - -· 
• J;;i ;. - - ;_ 2..- ..-...... 
I. Each Branch should be required to prepare a one' page summary stat~kt of tile ioan l~ss ~erve on~ qUJu:!erly basis ,t!_latre~eile~ t¥~alanoe sheet fisw:_e:~~.!f~ ~""£ 
treatment ofvanous loans. Billllches will need a quarterly APO to do thiS.'"!:,'"'•'. -~-
,~ =-~ -~ _.... :: ~- ~=-- ~·-·::~ ~ ··:-_ ._., ,·~-~~~-::.. 
2. As a general rule, reserving 2% of'disoursements across an b.ranches"continues-~to ~a 
.. ·- -;;;;;''-~ ~y .. ~ - -... .. ............. "~·---
goocJ. f.!s~ management system at a, !J,e,!l~;.o.f_fs~._l~el.j We recoJl!Ill~d .though lliJtA~i. 
branches contribute an amoUDt that reflects the.ir performance, rather than a flat 2% of 
disbursements. Some variation oftheSJStemwe"USed above (Le. 100%'-ofNmLfuid 
over 100 weeks past due) is suggestCd.'f.Z; · · . -- , , ~"' 
·- '.I.. . ~;. •• L :: ·t ....... , r 11,g.r. 
• ..~t -~~-
3. As BRAC expands the MELA pro~ increased provisions for losses should be made~ We recommend a loan loss ~ense of 4% UDtil BRAC has a sufficient track 
~~ ~~-
:;. 
..... ~ 
~ 
''··. 
4. We recommend that any loan. that is over three years past due plus an NmL should be 
foan.ally wrinen of[ the balance sheet. BRAC should continue efforts to coUect these 
loans should this be possible and any income shotild..be shown as a recoverY, but th~e 
loans sbould not be carried on the balance sbeeL · - · ·•· •· 
3.6 Possible sectoral loan concentration risk Issues 
In support of research on an 
alternate system of branch 
categorization (section 
5.11), Shorebank did an 
analysis of the degree of 
sector concentration of 
branch ponfolios. To do it 
adequately, this analysis 
needs more time than that 
available as part of the 
Financial Review. Early 
indications, however, give 
rise to a concern about 
sector concentration. As the 
graph to the right suggests, 
there are many brancbes that 
have a significant 
concentration in a single 
Misc. 
Food Pmcesslng 
Rural Trading 265 
CArtage Industry 
Flsherl" 
Agriculture 
1 10 100 
Number of Branches/Outposts With Gruter Than 
30% of Portfolio In Single Sector 
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sector. That lack of diversi£cation may create significant risk management issues that 
should be explored further. It may be, however, that the basic data which describes 
which sector a loan is made in is so flawed that this analysis must wait on a significant 
improvement in loan sector information quality. For more detail on this analysis, see 
section 5.11. 
3. 7 Portfolio trends relative to model branch 
BRAC built its model on the following assumptions: 
• new members in BRAC will grow until the 330 branches as per the RDP proposal 
have reached their capacity (i.e. around 6,000 members per branch) 
• members' income will gradually improve 
• repeat loans will be requested by members as they develop their enterprises 
• larger loans will be requested by repeat borrowers 
• savings deposited by members will increase over the years 
Because BRAC never factoredinfiation(currently at 7%-8% per year) into its model 
and internal targets, the targets for loan size disbursed are often smaller than the actual 
absolute values achieved. However, the real increase (i.e. once inflation is discounted) is 
often less than the original target set. 
Membership. RDP membership far exceeds th.e original RDP plan of 6,000 members 
per branch. All Year 8 to Year 13 branches have between 7,000 and 8,000 members. 
While we bave110t seen a decrease in portfolio quality associated with this increased 
membership (except a slight decrease) in very old branches, we have also not seen older 
branches bring in the additional savings and interest income to their full potential. 
BRAC should be aware oftbe trade·offs involved in greater coverage of poor people 
through the existing branch network. Generally, we believe that BRAC's entrepreneurial 
approach to expanding its market coverage and meeting the credit needs of poor 
borrowers (e.g. through opening sub-offices) is a positive strategy. The branch managers, 
who already have a fulJ workload, should get the additional support they require from 
regional managers as the expansion of their portfolio materializes. BRAC head-office 
staff capacity should also be expanded to ensure close monitoring of performance. 
Loan.s. The number of loans per branch increased substantially above BRAC's original 
targets and more or less in line with internal targets. This is not surprising given the 
increase in average membership across branches as dis.cussed above. What is surprising 
is the numberofloans did not increase more in Year 9- 13 branches in line with their rise 
in membership. 
Disbursements and Outstandings. The term m~x is 99% one-year loans, which means 
that loans do not build up on the books. ·On average, loan outstandings are in above 
original budgets (which did not take inflation into account) and in line with internal 
targets. Overall, the internal targets fur the number of loans has not been reached 
although Taka disbursed is above target. This means that BRAC is overestimating the 
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number of loans and underestimating average loan size. Member to Borrower ratios are 
20% higher in younger branches than in older branches. If it is true that older members 
have done so well that they no longer need loans, we should be able to capture an 
increasing amount of savings from this target group. 
Borrower to Member Ratio. One are for further examination is the ratio between 
borrowers and members in a branch. Drawing on the June 1998 Model Branch 
idfonnation, the chart below was developed. The total number of members was divided 
by twice the number of loans that bad been disbursed during the first six months of the 
year. If anything, this overstates this ratio. 
The result is a graph that suggests that borrowing activity drops significantly as the 
branch ages. This is an important phenomenon to understand, and is an important 
ingredient in understanding both future loan demand as well as providing some insight 
into branch function and vitality. Weighted by the number ofbranches in each branch 
year, the weighted average for the total system is a borrower to member ratio of75%. 
Year 13 1 
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4. Management and Analysis of Savings Activi ties 
4.1 Savings Program Summary Performance 
' 
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The diagram above shows that the strong growth in savings reflected between December 
1996 and September 1997 (see adjacent chart) did not repeat itself over the past year. On 
average, relatively little growth occurred in older branches where savings accumulation 
11<1.600 
"11<1.400 . 
11<1.200 
11<1.000 
Change In Average Savings par Branch 
(Dec 96 to Sept97) 
.. .. 
-~ 
• 
p 
-
might be expected 
180
"" to be higher. 
160% 
140% Whereas the 
120% 
average weekly 
savings per member 
100% increased 20% 
80'1. between June 1996 
60% 
and June 1997 to 
Tk4.98, it fell by 
oW% 7% over the past 
20% year (June 97-
0% 
June 98) to Tk4.62 
per member per 
week. Total 
savings increased 
22% from Tk1,430 
in June 1997to Tkl,741 in JUDe 1998 (vs. a 30% increase in growth the previous year). 
~ 
• 
• > )! 
The chart below shows growth in the same set ofbranches lietween December 1997 aod 
June 1998. Clearly, a noticeable higher savings growth rate is occurring in younger 
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branches. To an extent this is counter-intuitive, as one would expect greater asset 
accumulation to be happening in the older branches. 
Tk12,000 
Tk10,000 
Cumulative A vera go Savings I Branch 
In Each Ago Cohort (TkOOO) t------------::-:-----1 
TI<S,OOO Doc 1997 vs. June 1998 
Tk6,000 
TkA,OOO 
Tk2,000 
• Cumulative Avg Savings/Branch 
Tk 
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There may be at least four reasons that could have contributed to the lower per member 
average weekly savings rate, and the slower total savings growth rate: 
l. fntake ofPoorer Members: BRAC has integrated a larger number ofVGD members 
into its program than in the past and bead-office managers bave also been prioritizing 
absorbing poorer members into the RDP program in the past. The argument here 
would be that a higher percentage of poorer members are unable to afford to pay 
Tk I 0 bi-weekly; hence the downward pressure on the rate- Over the past year, over 
l 00,000 VGD members have been absorbed as part of regular branch expansion in 
BRAC's RDP credit program. 
2. A Cash Management Problem: Due to the bi-weekly system, a portionofBRAC's 
members may not be able to manage their cash in a way that enables them to dole out 
a double loan repayment plus a double savings deposit every two-weeks. Managing 
cash from week to week is far easier than managing it for twice the length of time. 
3. 1moact oflnflation: Real personal disposable income available for savings decreases 
every year in line whh the rate of inflation. Seen in this light,'a similar decline in 
savings deposits is not 
an unlikely outcome. 
4. Unwillingness to Save: 
Lack of access to 
weekly savings is 
probably another reason 
why many members 
choose not to deposit 
any more than they can 
b 
5 
.. 
... 3 
t! 
2 
0 
3 
Average Weekly Savings Rate g i5 
Juno 95-96 June96-97 .Lne97-98 
get away with. Even though savings wilhdrawals are officially allowed after five 
years, most members are not aware of this. This is because many branch. managers 
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keep this infoonation from members because their performance, as managers, is 
measured on the extent to which they mobilize net savings. 
Two other factors that affect the savings rate are member discip.line and branch 
prosperity. On our field trips to U branches last year, we found that branches with less 
delinquency, has higher savings rates. Also, more prosperous areas also, on average, had 
higher savings rates. 
RCP and ROP Savings Performance 
(Tako in million) 
Compulsory Sa vines 
Members Own Savings 
Totol New Savings 
Transfer of GTF into Members Savings 
Members Own Savings e;<cludiog GTF 
Averoge Numb<r of Members 
Aver2ge Wk!y Svgs!Member GTF 
Averoge Wkly Svgs/Member GTF 
• 
June 97-Juno 98 
3 11 
459 
770 
s 
454 
1,985,418 
4.62 
4.57 
June 96-
June 97 
277 
383 
660 
25 
358 
1,538,878 
4.96 
4.63 
June 95- June 94-
June 96 Juno 95 
176 107 
247 us 
423 242 
23 0 
224 135 
1,264,484 941,543 
3.91 NIA 
3.12 2.86 
BRAC must increase its savings mobilization, either out of self-interest for liquidity 
purposes, or because it believes that asset accumulation for poor people is a worthwhile 
pursuit To support that goal, it must do field research to find out what motivates 
households to save, and how households prefer to investtheir accumulated resources [m 
cash vs. in seeds or livestock, etc.). 
4.2 Development of the pilot savings plans 
At the end of July 1996, BRAC began experimertting with two different savings schemes 
to test member response to more flexible savings products. The schemes, known as 
Model 1 and Model 2, were each introduced in three branches in the Norshingdi Region. 
Both schemes pay interest on savings at the same rate as weekly savings in all BRAC 
branches (Le. 6%). Members inmost of the branches in Norshingdi have a higher 
average monthly income than the average BRAC branch. We would thus expect weekly 
savings to be above average in these branches. 
Modell is the more restrictive model of the two. The model allows members to deposit 
additional savings and to withdraw those savings twice a year, as long as 25% of total 
savings remained in their account. The withdrawal is 1:reated as an interest free loan and 
members are expected to begin repaying it the following week in addition to their usual 
weekly loan repayments and savings deposits. BRAC only begins to pay interest on 
savings once the entire "loan amount" is repaid. 
The bead-office rule was that anyone who wished to partake in the Model I scheme could 
do so, as long as they continued to deposit th.e required minimum at weekly meetings. 
The intention was to see the impact on net savings (i.e. would withdrawals increase 
dramatically with this "new freedom" or not?). 
Last year we reported that the branch manager we visited introduced his own rules that 
allow only members who commit to deposit a substantial amount on a regular basis to 
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join the Model I scheme. We also observed that it was likely that the other two branch 
managers in the Model 1 pilot did the same thing . These branch managet'S also required 
that members disclose the reason why they needed to withdraw and seemed to encourage 
smaller withdrawals than members may otherwise have lllken on their own. Managers do 
this with a sustain ability focus to protect the savings base of !he branch. 
Over the past year, an additional one Taka, on average, was deposited by Modell brancb 
members per week, vs. the average for all RDP branches. This represents a 20% increase 
in weekly savings mobilization over RDP branches, and a 10% increase over the control 
branches used in the experiment 
Model 2 was introduced in three younger branches (around 4- 5 years old) and is the 
more i!exible scheme of the two. Wi1hdrawals are regarded as a separate activity from 
credit and are unresnicted. Members only need to ensure that they have the minimum 
required deposit to take out a loan (i.e. 5% of loan size for a second loan and 10% for a 
third). The average monthly member is Tk31 for model two branches vs. Tk20 in the 
control branches and Th.18.5 for all BRAC RDP branches. This represents a significant 
55% increase over the control branches and a 75% increase over RDP monthly savings 
mobilization numbers. · 
Without doing a field visit to the pilots this year, we feel that the only significant finding 
to take away from data presented to us is that in younger branches, members with 
freedom to deposit and withdraw at whim are choosing, on average, to savelDore. This 
finding bodes well for BRA C. which plans to introduce a range of more flexible savings 
products for members than in the past. 
4.3 Effects of the Current Account savings plan 
Current Savings Accounts were introduced at the branch level in January 1997. All 
transactions happen at the branch (vs. the VO meeting) and members can deposit and 
withdraw any number of times. The original policy stated that 'membet'S must deposit a 
minimum ofTk50 and withdraw a minimum ofTkSO during any 'One transaction. 
Practice at the branches, however, varies widely. No interest is paid on the current 
account product (vs. 6% on weekly savings). 
Performance to date is reflected in the table below: 
#branches 
Number of aecouuu 
Average deposil 
Average witbdra,.aJ 
Net Deposits 
Avg. Net deposits/ ale bolder (6 Mutb) 
Avg. Net depositslbru.ch (6 Mntb) 
Jan-June 97 
160 
5491 
190 
673 
1,045,115 
190 
6,531 
JulY-Dec 97 
292 
20,459 
134 
489 
2,217,874 
108 
7,595 
Jan -June 98. 
292 
20,459 
251 
379 
2,290,258 
112 
7,843 
There has been a 20% increase in the total net deposits per branch over the past year and 
a 120% increase in total current account deposits held atBRAC branches. While these 
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numbers sound impressive, we should bear in rnind that the increase is off a very low 
base, and to date, only I 0% of all BRAC members have opened current savings accounts. 
The average net deposit per member is on average three times smaller than the average 
net withdrawal. Average net deposits per member over the January to June period 
decreased from Tkl90 in 1997 to Tkll2 in 1998. Because savings behavior varies 
widely between borrowers, calculating the median deposit apd withdrawal size would be 
far more useful. Once BRAC's branch computer system is up and running, we 
recommend very close tracking of savings behavior of members. This is important not 
only to design new products, but also to forecast funding needs and how much cash to 
have on site at the branch. 
• ln order to grow deposits BRAC should actively market the product through branch 
staff. Members will not automatically be aware ofits advantages (i.e. safekeeping, 
liquidity and easy access). This means bram;b staff will have to be highly informed 
of its "selling points" when they try to increase deposits. 
• BRAC should accept small current account deposits at weekly or bi-weekly VO 
meetings, and large deposits at the branch. This will enable members who live far 
away from thd branch (2!an or more) from being inconvenienced. In future, BRAC 
may decide to employ a special savings PA to collect savings from the homes of 
members who wish to deposit on a daily basis. 
• Finally, with respect to the existing current account policy, we also do not think the 
restriction of a minimum deposit or withdrawal ofTk50 is customer-o.riented or in 
BRAC's interests. We do appreciate that other ways to cover transaction costs need 
to be devised (e.g. collecting smaller deposits atVO meetings). 
As no clear understanding of the savings preferenees of BRAC borrowers exists, it is 
difficult to suggest a set of savings products. We believe that significant savings 
behavior research must be done. When pilots are introduced, they should be consistently 
implemented (unlike the current pilots). We believe that BRAC should monitor and 
record all impacts of the new products on n~l savings, disbursements, outstandings and 
average loan size so that it can better forecast its cash flow needs. This data will also help 
tailor its products and services to meet its dual goals of customer responsiveness and 
internal funding requirements. 
Despite the tack of data on savings, we feel comfortable suggesting the following, i.e.: 
• BRAC should retain a weekly savings requirement, both for member discipline, 
collateral, as well as for "old age" security for members. 
• Members should be given a choice as to where and how they would like to deposit 
any amount over the required weekly or bi-weekly minimum. 
• BRAC should develop a range of savings products with different structures, pricing 
and maturities. 
• Interest should only be paid on deposits that are, on average, above a certain 
minimum, and remain in BRAC for a certain length of time. There may initially be 
two additional products to the weekly savings and current account products that pay 
members interest if they leave a required minimum of savings in BRAC for 6 months 
or more. For examp !e. a !-year deposit would earn higher interest for the member 
than a 6-moruh deposit. 
Reccimmim.dations: ·s avings. ·: ... ~-•. :.; ~,;.~·•"J.:•;;·- ·- ·: 
1. Any new savings products that are introduced if!ll grounded iii clita"~Iiici;r=· 
pilot projects and from an in-depth study of customer . · · -
introduced should incorporate the fol.lowing featu:nrs: (a) 
VO meeting for small deposits anlf BRAC branch Qffice 
Liquidity. When borrowers come to withdraw~ they want 
Safekeeping. BR,AC must demonstrate that)t# a safe 
.~_, dep. ·ositor : ;:-"· .·· · .,; ,:·~ Jif.~-:t..:. 
·h .. ; ~ ' ' -. "'-J,. ... ~~s.. ,_ 
2. A range of products with ' and maturities. 
.. ~Jnterest should be paid on 
. . a(~ branch for longer 
3. · We believe that ifBRAC.iS"seriolis 
1 ... • . - !'>.~ - 0 - • • -~ 
who has a key staff person ;111 each reg~.on tha! IS . to !l!Jlllgs !JlO•bili.zation 
should be hired. ~,~;: • ··· 
1 
• • - • • • • ;;-
4. Individual level and branch level savings data 1:!~ to be collected and wit!J 
the same dedication that individual and branch levels disbursements and outstandings 
are tracked. :r · · ·"-· ·• 
5. BRAC should devise a syst~ based on data: aru;lysis of savings patterns to forecast 
its funding needs and the need for liquidity at the branch level, terms of data. • .. 
collection, we also think it is useful fur all braiiclies and bead-office to track ihe · 
following on a monthly basis: ...-....!-':;;~ ~:>..:-:~, ~ ' - :·. :;, • · 
6. The new branch rating system should .u';clnde. a ·savings measure (e.g. tQral net 
savings/outstandings), and branch stafrperfoanance should be pariially i:atecf o:ri 
. b'"--" -.. . . ·-· . savtngs mo ll.U.4UOO.. -. ~ .-.. ~ .:..!.Jt~ ·• ~· ·-
7. The current account savings product shou1d continue .to be marketed until 
alternative! additional products are develop~;t;;i- 1 ·- ' ' 
8. Branch managers are forced to allow members to withdraw freely within the policy 
guidelines suggested. ·-- . _~-.F.~ ~:._::_ :.0,_ :. . 
4.4 Refund of Group Trust Fund 
BRAC returned the outstanding 25% of the GTF money to members. Since June 1997, 
an additional twenty million was transferred to members. Currently, there is Tk3 million 
in the GTF account which BRAC is in the process of transferring to RCP members. The 
balance in the RDP GTF account is zero. 
5. Branch and RDP Financial Sustainability 
5.1 Summary 
1998 has been and 1999 will continue to prove difficult for BRAC with respect to the 
issues oflong-term program sustainabiJity and its component parts (specific cost behavior 
and control, interest and sector revenue, Joan loss rates, ponfolio growth, and loan size). 
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The combination of forces created by BRAC's continued growth and the 1998 flood will 
continue to create serious organizational and financial stress. 
While the following chapter works at length to examine the details ofBRAC's multi-
dimensional cost and financial performance, the graph below perhaps best expresses one 
underlying question facing BRAC management in the area of financial sustalnabiliry. 
Salaries ~~~ 
0% 10% 20% 
June 1997 to 
June 1998 
1rerco1otChango 
by Category 
30% 40% 
From June 1997 to June 1998, BRAC's portfolio expanded by 23% 
and the membership base grew by 22%. In contrast, operating 
expenses grew by 34% and salaries Increased by 33% 
What does this imply for RDP/RCP program sustainablllty? 
This basic challenge of cost management can be simply stated, but understanding and 
resolving the forces that are causing unsustainable cost in.creases will be a complex task. 
Based on our initial analysis of this issue, we recommend this task is given to a declicated 
BRAC multi-depamnenla.l (membership from inside and outside ofBRAC) "Cost 
Management Task Force." The problem of costs growing significantly faster than 
revenues & assets is a common problem for many rapidly growing companies, and it 
would seem that this is also a challenge for BRAC. This issue will be made more 
clifficult as the financial implications of the flood become visible and the full effect of the 
September Program Officer salary increase filters through the cost system. 
5.2 1997 to 1998 cost structure changes analysis 
As the summary BRAC RDPIRCP income statement below describes, many expense 
categories grew from June 1997 to June 1997 at a rate far greater than that supported 
either by member growth or by portfolio growth. As the graph in section 5.1 suggests, 
this is a subject that wiU require significant research andmanagemenl attention during 
1999. 
l 
I 
l ~I 
(all amounts In OOO's} Jan.June Jan .June 97-98% 
1997 1998 change • 
Financial Income 
Service charge on loan 356,973 512.438 44% Interest paid on deposits 37,009 50,074 35% -Interest on head office fund 87,542 87,128 0% 
Total financial costs 124,551 137,203 10% Gross financial margin 232,422 378,361 63% 
Provision for loan loss 57,638 68,123 18% 
Net financial margin 174,784 310,237 n% . 
Operating Expenses 
Salaries and benefits 125,688 167,141 33% 
Travelflransport 10,505 14,949 42% 
Staff train1ng 2,194 4,512 106% 
Maintenance 2,749 4,534 65% 
General expenses 4,414 6,712 52% 
Utilities 3,610 4.n9 32% 
Stationary 2,166 2,708 25% 
Depreciation 7,302 7,140 
·2% 
Home office supplies 10,182 11,639 14% 
otr1ce rent 3,839 3,495 
·9% 
Rent, utm, stationary for HO 
·2,107 ·3,126 48% 
Regional manager office cost 12,949 20,988 62% 
Home Office logistics 6,676 9,649 45% 
Total operabng expenses 190,167 255,125 34% 
T olal operating cost per branch 576 773 34% 
Sector Program Expenses 
Poultry and livestock 20,217 22,584 12% 
sector members 608.229 646,671 6% 
cost per member 33 35 5% 
Fisheries 8,013 12,108 51% 
sector members 96,201 135,866 38% 
cost per member 82 89 9% 
Social forestry 4,302 6,448 50% 
sector members 12,065 1'6,065 33% 
cost per member 357 401 13% 
Seric;ulture 9,524 10,326 8% 
sector members 23,655 24,054 2% 
cost per member 403 429 7% 
Horticulture and vegelable 9,179 12,820 40% 
sector members 84,160 61,324 
·27% 
cost per member 109 209 92% 
Total expenditure sector 51.235 64,286 25% 
Sector Income 
Poultry & llveslock 4,905 4,889 0% 
Fishenes 2,318 2,857 23% 
Foreslry 312 225 ·28% 
Sericulture 1,092 782 ·28% 
Rural enterprise 214 167 ·22% 
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Honicurture 
Tolar realized 
Total deficit for sector 
Total deficit for credit & sector 
Total income as %of exp. 
Membership 
2,383 
11,227 
-43,103 
·58,491 
86% 
1,800,000 
2,909 
14,804 
-03,035 
-192,089 
98% 
2.200,000 
5.3 Review BRAC's progress towards sustainability 
22% 
32% 
46% 
228% 
14% 
22% 
Despite the disturbing trend of increasing operating expenses, it is true that BRAC has 
been making continued progress towards sustainability and was meeting its RDP N 
target levels prior to th.e flood. As the graph to the right illustrates, the flood has 
signilicantly impacted 
the ability of the RDP 
credit program to recover 
its costs (become 
sustainable). 
In its January to June 
1998 income statement, 
RDP's 330 branches 
generated a net operating 
surplus ofTk55 million 
for its credit program 
compared with a loss of 
Tkl5 million for the 
same period last year. 
This positive 
achievement was more 
due to a signiiicant 
increase in revenues 
40% 
0% 
rather than a decrease in costs. 
%Cost Roeovory In Branch Ago Cohorts Pre and 
Post Flood (Jan .June 98 va. Jan-Sept 98) 
Year Year Ye;u Yoar Yeor Yeor Year Year Year Year Year Year 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1, 12 13 
The RDP N target for year-end 1998 was for BRAC to achleve a Tk27 million profit in 
its credit program. lf not for the flood, we believe that RDP would have made this goal. 
The flood, however, has impacted RDP severely and in its January to September income 
statement, the credit program suffered a net deficit ofTkliO million. Whereas the credit 
program's cost recovery (i.e. total credit related expenses vs. total credit related income) 
was at lU% over the January to June period, it dropped to 88% by September. 
The major single factor driving up costs was the increase in the loan loss provision 
expense. BRAC increased its loan loss provision expense from 2% of disbursements to 
5% of disbursements in September because of the flood. This means that an extra Tk150 
million was taken as an expense. Seen in. this light, a shift from a profit ofTkSS million 
to a loss ofTkllO million is understandable. While it is still too early to know the full 
effects of the flood ou the portfolio, and whether or not this 5% allocation will be 
sufficient, it seems to be the appropriate action to take at this time. 
·~· ~~~>"'-.: •..: : .. ·~- .. , .... '""<~ . .. 
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There were two other forces that also contributed to the losses. First, interest income was 
less than expected because of an increase in delinquency both during and after the flood. 
Around 400,000 families (or over 20% of all members with a loan outstanding) did not 
make a single payment during the month of September. Second, BRAC increased the 
salaries of itS approximately 3,000 Program Assistants by 30% to bring them more in line 
with comparable programs and the general labor markel This also will have a significant 
impact on the cost structure.. · _ 
We support both the ~rease in the loan loss provision and PO salary levels, but it is 
clear these changes have impacted significantly on the RDP cost structure, and on 
BRAC's sustainability, at least in the short term. The trend discussed earlier of costs 
increased at a faster pace than revenues is a more disturbing foetor that will ba~e medium 
and long term impacts if it is not addressed. It is hoped that this !lood impact, while 
serious, is not pellll8Ilent, in contrast to the increase in the sa.lary structure, which will 
have an enduring impacl The challenge to BRAC management will be to suppon the 
additional salary expense with in.ereased productivity, reduced losses, reduced staff 
turnover expenses, and decreasing its overall cost strucr:ure. 
Kev Cost Changes: Loan Loss and Salarv Expense 
As the following graph illustrates, each RDP/RCP branch has a relatively simple cost 
strucr:ure that is primarily composed of fixed costs with a smaller percentage of variable 
costS. The costS that tend to behave as fixed are staff salaries and travel eXpenses, 
supplies, interest savings costs, and logistics. The eXpenSes which are more variable, and 
40%r-------------------------------------------------------. 
35% 
25% 
20% 
15% 
10% 
5% 
0% 
Cost Structure of Typical RDPIRCP Branch 
Salallea. t..o.n loss Supplies. Member SalOnga HIO Fund RM/HO Legis !lea 
Benefita. Tralel Expense Prinllog1 General, lnte~eSI and Mgmr 
and Sid Traonlng F1cillty 
which fluctuate with the growth of the portfolio, are the loan toss expense and the cost of 
capital (head office fund costs). A!5 discussed previously, the largest single eX-pense 
increase was the loan loss expense increase from 2-5%, due to the anticipated portfolio 
impact of the flood Ironically, while the absolute amount of the salary expense also 
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increased vs. 1997, due to the large increase in loan loss expense, as a percent of total 
expenses salaries dropped from 1997 to 1998. 
Progress Towards Branch SustainabiliiV 
' While the flood has created a setback, BRAC continues to make progress towards a 
system of branches that are able to cove~ their costs. This will be threatened by the 
underlying rapid growth of costs. The graph below describes the sustainability status of 
the branches as of June 1998. In !his lioancial review, the ten:ns sustainability and 
profitability are used inrerchangeably. However, given that "profit" in an unincorporated, 
non-profit program is not a c<Jmmonly used te:nn or well defined, our preference is to use 
the tenn sustainable, meaning the ability to cover program costs or generate a program 
surplus. 
1UOO,OOO ,------------------------------, 
n •oo.ooo +-----------;; 
"'zoo,ooo +--------
.n lOO,OOIJ 
.n 400.ooo 
Average Pron~ablllly lor Each Branch Age Cohort 
Including lnter .. t on HO Fund (Jan 1998- Jun1111) 
• .,.. ••••••• J.._ ____________________________ _, 
Ye ul Yeul ·Tear4 YeuJ Yea'l Yearf Year l Y'e arl Teu 1f Ye., 11 'f••'t:l Ye utl 
5.4 Review branchwise financial performance and indicators 
BRAC reports five key performance ratios for each branch. At present, these measures 
are used primarily by head office and regional managc:rs, and were included in a financial 
management-training program offered to regional Managers in March of 1998. BRAC is 
working to make branch managers in the field more aware of the importance of these 
ratios. Overall, we believe ii will take significantly more tiaining and management 
attention to change the branch, regional and bead office management culrure to one more 
focused on branch sustainability and productivity. 
The reason to use ratio analysis is the ease it offers in comparing performance across 
branches and over time. Ratios allow comparisons while taking out some of the bias 
created by wide size variations between individual branches. This information can be 
used to conduct "peer" comparisons between branches or to consistently measure 
performance to targets. The following is a discussion of each ratio, wilh commentary on 
bow branches have improved from June 1997 to June 1998. 
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Financial ratio performance summary 
Shorebank bas found a detailed analysis ofbrancbwise perfonnance on five financial 
variables to be useful in getting below the "average perfonnance" of the system as a 
whole, and as we did in 1997, we submit the following analysis of these variables. 
Because this analysis is based on July 1997 to June 1998 data and comparisons, the effect 
of the flood is not reflected. We still believe, however, that this analysis indicates trends 
in the underlying cost and management structure ofBRAC's branch system, and is thus 
useful to examine trends and suggest areas for improvement and focus. 
The following five pages of graphics visually illustrate the 1997-1998 change in how 
branches performed for the selected financial indicators. The table immediately below 
summarizes bow all branches as an total system performed. As discussed below, this 
average performance obscures a more detailed year by year and branch by branch 
analysis that is more revealing in terms of specific action steps that must be taken. 
In general, BRAC RDP branches have improved in four of the five credit program 
indicators, with the exception of the salary cost or staff productivity ratio. While 
improvement in four out of five variables is good, and should not be understated, it is also 
IIUe that the 1998 ratio improvement was berter than the 1997 performance in only two of 
five ratios, indicating that the rate of improvement is slowing down. 
Average Average 1998 Better 
1996-97 1997-1998 or Worse 
Flnancial Indicator Change Change than 1997? 
lnterest income over OUISiandine portfolio 2% bener 2% benet Flat 
Ovcrnll rorio puUed down by some specific bmncbes; overall the great majority of branches bad sttong 
performance improvement 
Bnancb savi.ne:s over outstandiDe portfolio 6% bener I 5% better I Worse 
There was wide variability in how branches perfonned with rcspeCILO savings accumulation, but overall 
!.he focus on savings dropped during 1998. 
. 
Salaries over outstaudine: portfolio Flat It% worse I Worse 
'Illis suggests that salanes grew At a r.11e faster than !.he ponfolio which is a cause for concern. for this is 
a largely fixed cosr which porecrially bas strong ccononries of scale, and so !.he ratio should be 
improvillg as tbe-ponfolio grows. 'Illis concem is even stronger forth= ratios do not include the 
significant staff saWy incn:ase of September 1998, which will make this ratio even worse. 
11ranclt sustainabilitv natio I 1% better I 3% bener I Better 
Ti>e impTQVemc:nt in this raoo IS more due to an increase ID revenues than any sped fie cost managemen~ 
wb,icb stiU must occur. It is not thllt 3% improvement is not good, but it sbould be fiu- greater 
improvement than !his. 1hls does not include the impact of the flood, which will likely creale a drop in 
branch 1998 sustainability vs. 1997. 
Other eXPenses over oumandiDl! portfolio I 2% worse I 1% better I Better 
There is a high degree of variability in this measure, and it should be the focus of increased research to 
better understand its components. It is not clear what this ratio ioWcateS beyond the msigbt gecerated by 
the other four ratios. 
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5.5 Financial Ratios: Branch Level Detail 
The weakness of the macro-level analysis in the previous section is that a system-wide 
average ratio can mask a great deal of variability between brandtes. While it is true that 
taken as a whole, system-wide ave~es can indicate whethec the performance of the 
entire system is either inlproving or getting worse, action oriented analysis must move 
beyond this macro level analysis. To compe.nsate for this, what follows is a detailed 
discussion of each measure where we observe the "spread" hidden within !he average. 
The following five pages of detailed charts are provided for additional illustration of !he 
1997-1998 behavior of these financial ratios. 
Overall, we recommend that each branch manager know the status of his or her branch 
ratios, and project their performance for each coining year. Ali ratios should be measured 
as frequently as possible, and each manager should have a target for ratio inlprovement 
on a quarterly basis. 
1. Salary Expense as a Percentage of Total Loans OuJszanding. This ratio measures the 
productivity of staff because it compares salary expenses with the loan volume produced 
by that branch's staff. The lower the ratio, the more productive the b(anch. This ratio 
measures only the staff costs associated with the credit function, not the staff costs 
associated with sector development and other programs. 'This efficiency ratio is 
commonly used by credit institutions with branch/delivery systems. 
1998 performance of !his ratio is disturbing, for as the portfolio continues to grow at 
about a 25% annual rate, the salaryffPO ratio should decrease at a significant rate instead 
of increasing as il did in 1998. While there are clearly reasons that suggest that the ratio 
should not improve at the exactly same rate as !he TPO is growing, to have the salary 
ratio worsen by I% rather !han improve is a serious problem. As !he data in the previous 
section illustrated, salaries grew at a rate of ~3%, far beyond that supported by eilher 
portfolio or membership growth. This issue will require intense scrutiny. There is also a 
very wide variation between branches in !his ratio, much more than lbat suggested by 
differences in branch age or porrfolio size, which suggests different levels of 
management attention to this issue. As the histogram shows, most branches actually 
increased lbeir salaries by over 2%, double that amount suggested by lbe overall 1% 
average. 
2. Other Operating Expenses as a Percentage of Leans Outstanding. This ratio 
measures operating efficiencies in lbe non-personnel and loan expense areas. Branch 
operating expenses directly affects the branch's profitability. The lower the ratio, the 
more efficient the branch. We assume branch managers have control over these 
expenditures. As in l997, there is a high degree of dispersion in this ratio, suggesting 
that the Other Expenses caregory has mu.ch more variety across branches. Given lbat 
different areas make different uses of the sector and social development programs, this 
could create someofthis variation. As with salaries, however, given the growth of the 
portfolio, this ratio should be decreasing at a rate fur more than lbe 1% inlprovement - .: 
from 1997-1998. 
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3. Operating Profit as a Percent of Loans Outstanding. This catio measures profitable 
deployment of assets. The higher the ratio, the more profitable a branch. The 
denominator is total loans outstanding and excludes fixed assets. Overall, this catio 
improved on average by 3% from 1997 to 1998, which is the right direction but not the 
right amount. As the gcaphs suggest, there is also a very significant dispersion in this 
ratio among branches and across yeatWi~e branches which suggests that there are relevant 
variables that can be explored to improve this ratio. Compared with the 1997 ratio 
analysis, fewer malllre branches that have a negative ratio, but the presence of any mature 
bcanches which has a negative ratio is a cause for concern. More than any measure, this 
one should be a focus of branch and regional manager training. 
4. Savings as a Percentage of Total Loans Outstanding. This ratio measures the 
relationship between member savings to loans outstanding. It shows the ability of the 
branch to fund loans from savings. Since the cost of member deposits is 3% less than the 
cost of the loan Jiom HO, member savings allow branches to increase their interest 
margin and thus increase branch sustainability. The h.igher the percentage the better. 
While an avecage growth of 5% in this ratio is positive, the presence of a significant 
number ofbranches of all ages that were able to grow their assets by between 10-20% 
suggest that it is very possible to do much better than 5%. There are branches that are 
performing so poorly thai they are pulling the total average down by a significant margin. 
As in 1997, the results of 1his savings ratio analysis are very disturbing, given the 
importance of mobilizing savings resources to support membersh.ip asset growth and 
lending activities. There continues to be great dispersion between bcanches and between 
branch maturities, suggesting that branches have an extreme variation in their ability to 
develop savings assets and there seems to be no learning curve resulting from experience. 
What is particularly disturbing is that the older branches that would be expected to have a 
greater ability to raise and retain member deposits to fund loans actually seem to have a 
lower ability to fund loans and raise savings deposits. This is yet another indicator of the 
serious attention that the entire savings program and strategy needs to receive ifBRAC 
intends to grow and to continue to fund at least 40% (or more!) of its loans outstanding 
from member deposits. 
5. Interest Income as a Percentage of Total Loans Outstanding. This ratio measures the 
yield on the loan portfolio. It is a quick way for a manager to look at overall interest 
yield on a branch's loan portfolio. Lower performance could indicate loan quality 
problems and could also indicate a significant number ofloans in the NIBL category, 
since this income is not accrued, but is only recognized when it is received. 
Given that there is little loan interest rate variability between branches, this ratio may be 
most useful a.s an indicator ofloan quality and delinquency. In general, the 1998 results 
are good, wh.ich is consistent with BRAC's strong focus on credit quality. There is a 
relatively narrow spread between the branches but substantial dispersion within branches 
of slmilar ages. 
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Recommendations: Management of Branch Operations 
1. lt is our belief that while branch age has in the past been a useful indicator of branch 
behavior and other issues such as sustainability, given the increasing maturity of the 
branches, there are now going to pe other variables that will rise in importance. Vj e 
recommend below that BRAC begin a ~ultivariate analysis of branch performance, and 
within 9eVeral years develop a system of branch categorization that is not based solely on 
the age of the branch but other, more revealing internal as well as external economic and 
demographic variables. This system wilfoecessitate a restructuring ofBRAC's computer 
model used for forecasting and projections. ''· · •. c · i • · 
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2. Although this is slowly beginning to change, it is our assessm~t that the bt:aiiC!i ·. 
managers do not have a strong foqus on brai:tqt sostainability 4r profibbilit)f.~e b~ch 
manager is still primarily focused on the bran~ as a "cost ~enter".or'a deliv~p'r~ess 
for program activities. This is not wrong, ~ut it iS insufficient, espeei~ly fo~4hr3Dch and 
regional managers. With an eye towards a future BR,AC bank orjust 9ri the~~cient use 
of resources, we would suggest an increased focus on branch profitability and · 
sustainability. Such a focus should take many forms, but at a minimum lhere.should be a 
monthly measure and displayed graph tracking branch profitability. This process should 
be accompanied by speci£c targets and stz:ategies. 
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5. 6 Cost recovery performance o f the sector programs 
PROGRAM 
1. Poultry & Livestock 
Chicks (DOCs) 
Goat Rearer 
Cow Rearer 
2. Fisheries 
Carp Polyculture 
Sarputl Culture 
Carp Nursery 
Fish Hatchery 
3. Vegetable Cultivation 
Vegetable CultiVation 
Nursery . 
4. Serlculture 
Sapling 
OFL Egg 
RATE/ UNIT 
1.5 /chick 
20 /rearer 
50 /rearer 
500 /acre 
300 /acre 
1,000 /acre 
1,000 /hatchery 
500 /aae 
150 /nursery 
0.1 /saphng 
1/0FL 
ln 1993 BRAC began 
incrementally collecting service 
charges for its four sectoral 
programs. The charges for 
technical assistance rendered by 
sector staff can be found in the 
adjacent table. The introduction 
of service charges was a 
mec.banism that BRAC devised 
to makes its sector programs 
self-sufficient over time. 
1n BRAC's RDP IV proposal, 
the projected rate of cost 
recovery for all sectors programs 
was 30% for 1998. The chart 
below compares the projected 
cost recovery from the RDP IV 
plan (Le~ 30%) with acrual cost recovery of all the sector programs which was 11% 
below the projected target at 19%. The chart shows that only cost recovery in the social 
Cost Recovery of Sectors: Actual vs. Plan (Jan- Sept 1998) 
50%~==~~~~~ 4$%+~--~~------------~ 
40% 
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0% 
Poultry ond 
U10totod< 
fishera Agrloul uro 
(lnolud Training Coots) 
S.rleutw. Social Fontstry Tota 
forestry sector is ahead of target as per the RDP TV plan. Cost recovery in the fisheries 
sector is almost on target an.d it was possible that, absent the flood, this target would have 
been met by the end of 1998. The same does not hold true for the Agriculture and 
Poultry and Livestock sectors, which are substantially below their target Sericulture, 
which bad extremely low cost recovery targets to begin wilh. is also behind budget 
There are rwo possible reasons why sector cost recovery is below target: (a) the targets 
were unrealistic to begin with; or (b) costS are higher than projected and/or service 
charges realization is below expectations. We do not have enough information to analyze 
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whether targets set were realistic or not Our instinct, however, is that they were not 
overly ambitious. 
I Percent of Due Service Charges Realized I 
100%r----------------------------------------------------------------
90% -!-------------------------------
80% 
70'k 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Poultry and 
Uvastock 
Asherles Agrlcunu .... SaricuJturo Total 
We do know that there is cenainly room for improvement with respect to service charges 
realizat.ion. Even before the September flood, there was an increase in total service 
charge delinqu.ency if we compare-collections between January and June 1997 with 
collections during the January- June 1998 period. Actual delinquency is worse as 
BRAC's information system can presently only track delinquency in the current period. 
Delinquent service charge payments from any previous period go unchecked. Total 
overdoes are thus far greruer. 
There are se\'eral reasons why people may not pay servtce charges that are due: 
• BR.-\C staff do not spend enough effon on tracking and foUowing up overdoes 
• Members are dissatisfied with the service provided and thus are not prepared to pay. 
Perhaps the service was not provided at all (e.g. in the case of chicks, they pay for the 
technical assistance at the point that they buy the chick. What is the incentive then 
for the Poultry PA to ensure service if payment is already received). 
• Members cannot afford to pay. This is a dubious argumetl( as the basic premise of 
the sector programs is that it increases the household incomes of members 
substantially. 
• Members do pay charges, but money does not reach the branch office. 
Apart from sericulrure participants who have often had business failures and therefore are 
unwilling and/or unable to pay service charges, we believe that payment of service 
charges is not due ro a lack of affordabiliry by members. This is especially so if the 
estimated annual net profit/member that were given to us for the various sectors is rrue. 
This leaves two causes: either the qualiry of the service delivered is poor or RDP staff are 
not persistent enough in chasing overdoes. 
The good news is that both these causes can be fixed. A good MIS system to enable 
branch management and staff to track overdoes, and a performance incentive system to 
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encourage their collection is necessary to reinforce good collection behavior of staff. 
(See Appendix l for notes concerning the design of the sector program and MIS system.) 
Until the delivery system for technical advice is changed (see below), we feel that a fixed 
point in time (rather than "some time" during the season) should be set where members 
are expected to pay. Our general rule is that the fixed time should occur sooner rather 
than later. For example, chick service charges should be paid on receipt of the day old 
chick. Ongoing profits from chick rearirig are substantial enough to pay this relatively 
small amount up-front. Exceptions in all sectors shquld only be made for members who 
truly cannot afford to pay them, and this should happen only with the consent of the 
sector PO or branch manager. 
Fixing poor quality service delivery is more difficult Is it because staff members are not 
trained adequately, or is it because they are unable to train and assist VO members 
effectively? This is an area that BRAC will need to research. We believe that it is 
important to tie payment for services to value received by participants. Our suggestion is 
to privatize the delivery of technical assistance (See Appendix I) . .BRAC can train, and 
perhaps certify, village participants to deliver the service. Thereafter, it is entirely up to 
them to sell their services in the village . .BRAC has already done this with some of its 
services (e.g. para-vets) and is actively considering implementing some version of the 
above. 
11<500 
11<450 
Tl< 
Ccst of Sectors Spread Over tho Number 
of Saetor Participants 
Tl<~~==============~ 
ll<~+------------------------4~ 
Tl<~+-~o~~~~m~ta~~~~7.~~~~r-----~· 
Tl< 200 •~t.Member .an.J..., 98 
11<1~+-------------------------~· 
11<100+------------------====-----+ 
11< 50 +-------------1 
Tl< 0 ..__J....;..;."" 
Social Foresby Agri:ulure 
O!velopm!l. 
Addressing serVice charge delinquency deals with the revenue side of the equation. 
Reducing cost or expenses in each of the sectors is the other side that BRAC needs to 
address. Sector cosiS have increased because of inflation, increases in staff salaries, and 
increases in the oumber of staff. The chart above shows takes the sector costs for the first 
six months of 1998 and divides them by the number of participants in the each sector as 
at June 1998. It does the same for 1997. 
Costs per member have gone up in all sectors, with much more remarkable increases in 
the Social Forestry and Agricultural Sector. The number of participantS in vegetable 
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production shrunk over the past year, which. accounts for a substantial portion of the 
increase as the costs are positively correlated with the number of participants in the 
sector. Serlculture, which has around 24,000 participants bas a far higher cost per 
member than poultry and livestock whichhas over 400,000 members. Because the 
sector program has not developed a good MIS tracking system, it l1as beert difficult for 
BRAC to know how many PAs to cut back on when membership in a sector drops, or 
how many to add when membership grows. As a result, Sericulture, for example, is 
overstaffed. 
Recommendations: sector program-charge-recovery ' -
I. A sound MIS tracking system is neces5arYlf'o(BRAC. t0 improve its service charge 
realizations as well as to be able to cut costs wherefeasible . . This is tbe single most 
- Tl!"~·- ..,g .. t..I.U·..... ...,~ ·- ,. • 
important recommendation we have for1hiS sectoz:,. and mostiecommendatioos below 
- .. ~- ..._ ••;- ••• 4F .,•, 
should be incorporated as part of this tral;kfug system.· The system should track •·· 
inputs to branches and cost recovery, aeiiVit)r oft!ie' sector programs, staffing, and 
service charge realization against seiVice charges due. · 
~ 
2. It is important to set up tight collection systenlS, which members know are not 
flexible. This means that, where possible, fixed dates for payments should be set (e.g. 
during the first week of the harvest seasC?n, or immediately on receipt of a chick). 
3. In line with setting up clear guidelines for service charge collection, we feel that past 
due service charges should be tracked over rime as per the APO model (e.g., 0 weeks, 
1 - 4 weeks etc.). 
4. The perfonnance of sector staff at the branch should be based not only on the 
percentage of on-time collections, but also on the quality of the past dues (i.e. how 
many weeks overdue etc.). 
5. Because activity varies widely from the planned activity for each sector, we suggest 
that branch staff officially revise activity targets on a qual\erly basis in conjunction 
with head-office. 
6. Finally, we believe that BRAC should start thinking about a way that members pay 
only for services that they fee1 add value. Privatizing services, as discussed above, 
is one way to do this. 
5. 7 Review the RCP financial model 
Substantial improvements have been made to BRAC's financial model since last year. 
Last year we observed that, given the new challenges and questions BRAC faces, the 
model sh.ould have an: increased focus on liquidity management, more accurate 
projections of savings growth and savings products, additional loan products, 
incorporation of the PKSF loan funds, and different MELA Joan products. What follows 
is a brief update on improvements that have already been addressed: 
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(a) MELA loan growth has been factored in, but further adjustments need to be made as 
.MELA's growth trajectory becomes more explicit. 
(b) A more formal write-oifpolicy has been factored into the model. 
(c) The use of the PKSF loans to fund loan growth still needs to be factored in. 
(d) Current projections of savings growth have been revised and provision for realistic 
withdrawals have been added. The model needs to be expanded to include other 
savings products, as they becom~ available. 
(e) The loin portfolio has been structured to allow it to grow beyond the current Tk300 
million level. 
(g) Provisions for additional, longer-term loan products supporting MELA requirements 
were incorporated. 
(h) A way to measure asset/liability management needs was incorporated into the model. 
(i) The current model places significant reliance on the category of investments as a way 
to compensate for growth and profits, and this should be largely reduced for it is 
nor the best use of funds, excess funds should be targeted for loan portfolio 
growth: StiU to be done. 
(j) The model shou.ld be spJjt up into diiferent spreadsheets within the same workbook, 
and up dared tO use the capabilities of the more recent versions of Lotus or Excel. 
SriU to be done. 
(k) More extensive use of graphs as analytical indicators are now being used. 
(I) The net interest margin behavior in light of different liquidity scenarios needs to be 
understood better. Still to be done. 
(m) Credi t programs need to be more formally separated from noncredit programs, so as 
to unders[ll1Jd the level of subsidy and interaction between the various program 
areas. Still to be done. 
5.8/mp/ications for RDP/RCP of the VGD program 
Although the number ofVGD women has increased both inside and outside ofRDP, we 
see no hnpact on the financial sustainability on RDP. Neither do we see any reason why 
VGD-relared funding requirements from donors should vary much from the amount in 
the revised RDP fV budget The reason for the above is that almost all costs oulSide of 
RDP are being financed by the Govemmeori\VFP for current VGD members and by 
PKSF for ex-VGD members. This is nm as a separate program from RDP and is required 
to be separate not due to BRAC's wishes. but due to government and WFP requirements. 
There are presently SO VGD branches outside ofRDP branch office areas. These 
branches have·around 300,000 members and the program is run very similarly to BRAC's 
RDP model. Each branch has its own branchmanagementstaffthat is separate from 
RDP branch office staff. RDP's regional managers and regional sector staff, however, do 
oversee the VGD offices. The VGD program pays for the regional managers and sector 
staff rime on a pro-rata basis. For example, if the 30 regional managers oversee an extra 
one or rwo branches over their 10 RDP branches, then 1/11 of the salary of the regional 
manager is paid for by the VGD program. 
Within BRAC's branch office areas, VGD participants are all part ofBRAC's regular 
target group. No additional costs arc thus incurred. Around 300,000 ofRDP's regular 
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members are either VGD or ex VGD recipients. As BRAC is focusing on admittina very 
poor members into its program, this number is expected to grow. " 
5.9Review the status of the BRAC Bank Proposal 
BRAC management tried several times (late 1980's, 1990, 1996) to get special legislation 
to allow RCP to become an independent microfinance bank which was not open to be 
used. as a football by political parties. T)lis was not politically possible. BRAC was then 
faced with two alternatives: (I) to drop the idea of a Bank that could mobilize resources 
for its RCP program and other development initiatives, or (2) to pursue a commercial 
bank charter. BRAC chose the latter and reapplied in 1998, this time for a commercial 
bank charter. BRAC is currently waiting written authorization from the Central Bank. 
Once it receives this written authorization, it will devise a business plan and governance 
structure for the Bank. 
Not much more is clear at this point, except that it might be very difficult to absorb RCP 
btanches into the bank. There are three reasons for this: 
I. The Central Bank controls very closely who, where, and how many branches any 
particular bank may open. RCP has 330 branches. Generally, opening a single 
branch is a highly bureaucratic, time consuming and politicized matter. 
1. The goverrunent regulates the interest rate for commercial banks. BRAC's RCP 
program will be put under severe financial pressure if the effective interest rate is 
suddenly reduced by I 0%, which is likely to be the case. Grameen got special 
permission to charge higher rates because it is not a commercial bank. BRAC is 
unlikely to be able to do the same. 
3. :Vlost commercial banks lend to borrowers who have collateral. Most ofRCP's 
members to do not any collateral that could be realistically claimed against losses. 
The role the Bank plays vis a vis BRAC's RCP microfinance program is a crucial issue 
that will need to be worked om in coming months. BRAC management is seeking the 
advice of outside specialists to help them find the best way to ensure that the Bank can 
make a serious community economic development impact that directly affects the lives of 
the poor in Bangladesh. The furure ofRCP will be an imponant pan of that solution. 
We believe that commercial banks have a number of attributes making them panicularly 
attractive as community de'lieiopment instiTUTions. As a regulated, large-scale institution, 
a bank is known, trusted, legitimate, well capitalized and self-sustaining. It has (and this 
will certainly be true in BR.-\C's case) an unusual capacity to be continuously 
knowledgeable about the local economy. Further, a bank can convert ordinary deposits 
into development loans; through doins so, it leverages its capital multiple times over. 
Finally, as a regulated business, the bank is forced to work to 11'"11ottom line discipline that 
ensures a focus on being effective and efficient. 
A bank alone, however, cannot accomplish these objectives in the context of distressed 
communities with dy:sfunctional markets. Other development capacities thar complement 
the investment activities of the bank are necessary. In the case ofBRAC Bank, its 
relationship with RCP wiU be especially important. The challenge is to devise a structure 
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that safeguards the interests of the rural poor (both the donor capital, as well as savings 
deposits of members), and at the same time, enables BRAC Ia continue to expand the 
depth and breadth of its poverty alleviation programs with maximum impact. 
5.10 Review RDP financial status against RDP IV projections 
This was an explicit category ofShorebank's terms of reference but has been covered 
throughout this repon. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 provide a deeper discussion of this question. 
5.11 Explore the creation of an improved branch rating system 
The primary mechanism that BRAC uses ui categorize and analyze branches is the "age" 
of each branch (e.g., Year 2 branch, ... Year 13 branch). For the past decade, this may 
have been a useful system of categorization, but as the total p.rogram matures this 
category system has less and less meaning. Based on our analysis, there is as much 
variability between branches of the same age as there is between branches of different. 
ages. The creation of a totally new branch evaluation, categorization and rating system is 
well beyond the scope of this financial revie--v, but the brief comments and analysis that 
follows may be useful as this conversation continues to be explored. 
The first step in this process is to be clear on the puipose of any branch categorization 
system. While there may be many reasons far a branch categorization system, the one 
that is relevant for Shorebank's review is that BRAC needs an improved ability to 
forecast portfolio risk, portfolio growth, fimding and staff requirements, and differential 
branch behavior. A branch. with a b.igh degre.e of concentration in the poultry or food 
processing sector might well have different staffing and portfolio risk characteristics than 
one with a b.igh concentration in rural trading. Ibis dynamic may increase with the 
gro"''th of the MELA program, given its greater vulnerability to sectoral market issues. 
There seem to be at least two new set of branch characteristics that may prove useful in 
predicting furure branch nnd portfolio behavior. The first type of data involves the 
examination of the sectorwise distnoutioo of each branch's pomolio. The second set of 
data involves the demographic and economic context of each branch, e.g., is the branch in 
an economically strong thana, or within a purely agricultural community or a 
manufacmring region, or a region ofhigher than normal population density, etc. 
What follows is an examination of the sectorwise distnoution of the portfolio across 
branches. Shore bank does not have access to any demographic or economic information 
about the thanas surrounding the various branches. This data is hopefully available from 
the relevant Bangladesh. government agencies that track and measure demograpb.ic, 
economic and social variables. Obtaining this second type of data and exploring this 
second type of branch categorization must of necessity be pursued by BRAC. 
Sample sector-based branch tategorization system 
Of the roughly 500 total BRAC lending entities (RDP and RCP branches and outposts, 
IGVGD branches, and urban lending branches), a significant percentage .have more than 
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30% of their portfolio in a single sector. The most common portfolio concentration is in 
rural trading, not surprising given that overall there is over 50% of the entire RDP loan 
portfolio in the rural trading sector. 
An obvious first question that has to be asked is whether or not the "Joan sector" 
information in the BRAC credit tracking system is accurate. There are arguments that 
suggest that because this information h~ not traditionally been an important piece of 
. 
Misc. 
Food Processing 
Rural Trading 
Cottage Industry 
P ou I try /Livestock 
Fisheries 
Agriculture 
1------'3 
3 1---....J 
10 
11 
100 1000 
Number of Branches/Outposts With Greater Than 
30% of Portfolio in Single Sector 
information to BRAC management, this sector information is not accurate. Similar to 
this question is the previously raised point that the rural rradi:rig sector classificarion has 
rumed imo a "catch all" category that covers a multitude of erueiprise sectors, and is thus 
not useful. lt is not within the scope of this review to be able to determine the qualiry of 
data ofthe "sector'' loan designation, bur that clearly must be done. 
Assuming, however, that the qualiry of sector information is sufficient to suppon a 
preliminary analysis, the scaner diagrams and histograms on the following three pages 
suggest that it may be useful to explore the benefits of a limited sectoral branch 
classification system. The following is one suggested system for branches that are 
particularly sector focused. 
Sector CateJ!OI'V D~ree of Concentration 
Rural Trading ·Branches> 60% concentration 
Food Processing Branches> 30% concentration 
Comment 
Combination of sectoral focus 
and qudality of data issue 
Specific sector and market risk 
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Misc. Sector 
Fisheries 
Poultry & 
Livestock 
Branches > 30% concentration 
Branches> 15% concentration 
Branches > 20% concentration 
and technical support needed 
Data problem, needs to be 
cleaned up 
Risky sector, needs special 
attention 
Specific sector and market risk 
and technical support needed 
This analysis is by no means sufficient to implement a new branch classification system, 
even on a lrial basis, but is meant to be indicative of tbc type ofanalysis that is necessary 
and possible. Additional analyses grouping branches and tbanas based on similar 
economic, demographic, and social criteria need to be explored as well. 
Other Categorization Systems 
Besides sectoral concentration and tbana demograhic and economic variables, two 
additional system,; might be explored. The rate of growth of a branch over a period of 
years might suggest that different management systems, measures and progarns should 
focus in a different manner, depending on whether the branch is low, medium or high 
growth. The problems faced by these three different types of branches rnay very well be 
different enough. to warrant a different level or nature ofrnanagernent attention and 
support. 
Additionally, using emerging geographic information system (GIS) software may allow 
BRAC for the iirst time to understand different portfolio characteristics by location, 
natural resource base, proximity to lacy:r cities, or similar geographic characteristics. 
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6. Notes on the Challenge of Growth 
Diagnosing and researching the issues of growth.management for BRAC is not within the 
Donor Teems of Reference for this Financial Review, nor was there adequate time during 
our time in country to give this issue the attention that it deserves. It is clear, however, 
.from a number of perspectives, that this is a· fundamental issue for BRAC. The few 
comments !hat we offer here should be seen as only a brief indication of the issues and 
the possible steps that might be taken to take this analysis further. 
1. Step One: Acknowledge the issue, build capacity to respond 
There are many ways to diagnose and respond to the complex issues generated by rapid 
company growth, and what f<>llows is only one type of approach. The first suggested step 
is to acknowledge that as long as BRAC grows at above 20% per year, it needs to 
acknowledge that "growth management" will continue to be an issue. At the current pace 
of about 25% annual growth, BRAC is doubting its asset and membership base every 
three years. This is a'n incredible pace of growth. for any organization, lei alone an 
organization dealing with the host of complex issues that BRAC works with. 
Managing growth is not and will not be a one-time event, nor will it be an ad-hoc 
"project" that creates an "answer" that can then be implemented to solve the problem. 
Constant and strong growth is much more of an ongoing and systemic issue that affects 
all parts of the company, from physical space needs to human capital & training to loan 
capital funding requirements to many other elements. Just as "quality control" is a 
constant issue for a manufacturing company and "customer satisfaction" is a constant 
tssue for a service company, "growth management" for BR.A.C will be a constant fact of 
life that requires ongoing attention. 
The first step is to realize that this is a task that .must be managed on a continuous basis, 
and as a result it is necessary to create capacicy to understand and help the organization 
manage this issue over time. We suggest a permanent management task force be created 
with a representative of key parts ofBRAC as well as representatives of some outside 
consulting resources. There must be dedicated staff resources to support the necessary 
R&D behind this task-this is not the kind of work that one does "on !he side" as pan of 
another job. The best result would be a combination of internal BRAC staff combined 
with external consultants skilled in organizational analysis and in diagnosing the 
problems of growth. 
2. Step Two: Diagnosis 
There are many ways to diagnose the organizational issues created by rapidly growing 
companies, and only a few are discussed here. 
Productivity measures and relationships. One of the most common measures of 
organizational stress is to ex.amine measures ofproductivicy, for it is here where the 
inefficiencies introduced through growth often appear. No smgle measure is the "right" 
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measure. An appropriately balanced selection of measures will enable management to 
see where the stresses of rapid growth are showing up. The k,ey is that the measure is an 
indication of a proc-ess or an ability ofBRAC to transform one resource into another (e.g., 
staff expenses into loans, sector TA into revenues or income created). In BRAC's 
situation, the following measures may be examples of useful indicators: 
• S.alaries divided by outstanding Joan p_ortfolio 
• Operating expenses divided by outstanding loan portfolio 
• The number of Taka it requires in expenses lo disburse one Taka of debt to a 
borrower 
• The number ofPOs to the number of members or borrowers or sector participants 
• Number of loans processed per month per branch staffperson or PO 
• Branch level profitability 
• Savings per member or loan amount per member 
• Loss rates per branch or even per single loan officer/PO 
• Time or rumaround behavior: significant changes in the time it takes to achieve a task 
such as making a loan, creating a report, getting information into regional or head 
office. 
Span of Control. Another measure that often can indicate where growth stresses require 
some attention comes under !he general beading of span of control. As an organization 
grows, key man~<>ementlevels often experience the number of factors, resources or 
variables they must manage increasing to an unwieldy or ineffective leveL Most 
common varieties of this are managers that are managing too many "direct reports", too 
many "programs", too many transactions, or too many assets. There is no magic number 
for these. The task is to look for areas where there-has been a rapid increase between a 
position and scope of responsibility in terms of people, decision making responsibility, 
resources, assets (or liabilities), number of transactions, etc. 
Sometimes it is possible that a specific position is able to absorb a significant increase in 
output or responsibility lhrough excess capacity utilization. use,of1echnology, increased 
training, etc. All too often, however, this is not the case, and the result is decreased 
efficiency, increased organizational risk. staff burnout and assocu!ted costs, and other 
negative results. The "savings" in staff expense are usually far outweighed by the 
additional risk that the organization incurs by not addressing this issue. 
Reporting level or detail. An issue that is related to span of control has to do with 
reporting and management detaiL Example: when BRAC had 500,000 members perhaps 
it was appropriate and possible for someone at the Head Office to be examining branch 
level detail. Given BRAC's current 2.1'million and rising membership, that level of 
involvement from that far up the management change is not appropriate or possible. 
Examining what decision authority and reporting detail is being "carried up" the 
management chain from branch to region and from regjon to bead office is another 
possible indicator of places where the old system is no longer appropriate to the current 
'- scale of operations. 
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Staff morale and tu"ruover. Another area where rapid growth problems show up has to 
do with the "human capital" of an organization. Looking for positions or areas that are 
showing increasing staff turnover, sickness, absentee rates, and so forth can be anolher 
indicator of an structure that has grown beyond its ability to be effective. Another related 
indicator might be tenure or time in position. If there are specific levels or types of 
positions that show a continuous trend of shorter and shorter time in that position, that 
indicates a possible area of increased risk where there is insufficient time to support an 
adequate Jeari:ung curve. 
3. Step Three: Response and resolution 
There are as many possible responses as there are problems, so this section is necessarily 
general and only suggestive in content. · 
Sources of help for problem resolution are other organizations, management consultants, 
and accountants or managers that have had experience with rapidly growing companies. 
Often individuals th!n have worked with lhe "franchise" industry have expertise in 
spotting and resolving these issues. It is important at this stage to involve people from 
outside ofBRAC, for often they can see alternate paths or resolutions. 
It is not always work harder or faster 
A rapidly growing organization often approaches boundaries or discontinuities lhat 
suggest that the "old way" of doing something cannot be "fine runed" any further, and a 
totally new set of management tools have to be implemented. The best current example 
is the process to computerize the branch reporting process. Clearly, the limits had been 
reached on the "paper reporting process", and continuing to reline that manual, paper 
based process would have yielded only very marginal improvementS. The decision was 
made that a totally new system of reporting an~ date collection needed to be adopted. 
The same will be rrue of other issues. It may be, for instance, that a totally new way of 
managing, measuring and staffing branches will be necessary to support increased 
growth, scale and management delegation from Head Office. lt may be that a new level 
of management in cenam areas will need to be created. to respond to rapidly increasing 
span of control issues. ft may be that a new department of employee training or credit 
R&D will need to be created to respond to issues and tasks lhat used to be handled as a 
due matter of course from a senior managers desk. The list could go on. The important 
fact is to realize that as an organization grows, it sometimes has to totally shift to a new 
way of understanding or managing a task, and realize that "improving .. the old process is 
not a sufficient response. 
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7. Other Areas of Special Donor Concern 
7.1 Micro Enterprise Lending Assistance (MELA) Program 
Overview 
The MELA program is aimed at stimulating growth of small enterprises. Th.e program is 
under two years old with the first loan being made in December 1996. Loans range from 
ruo,ooo to Tkl25,000. The average Joan is around Tk30,000. 
The primary management and policy question that remains to be resolved for the MELA 
program is simply stated, but hard to answer: "What is the purpose of the MELA 
program?" The nonexclusive choices are twofold: 
(a) MELA can serve as a "high-end VO lending program'' that serves to support local 
retail and service businesses and thus functions to redistribute preexisting viJlage 
wealth from non-MELA borrowers to MELA borrowers; or 
(b) MELA can serve as an "economic development'' lending program that serves value-
added (often manufacturing) enterprises with customers outside oftbe village/region, 
and thus serves the economic development function of bringing new wealth and 
income into the village. and overall strengthens the existing economic and asset base 
of the community. 
Clearly, the MELA program can Illllke either type of loan - loca.l or expon oriented- The 
question is what is the balance of the desired MELA overaJI ponfolio. Thenarural 
tendency of the BRAC "system" will be to make local market, retail sector l.oans, because 
that sector has most of the village enterprises and that is primary area of branch staff 
experiences. The argument for making local loans is that they are much easier to make, 
draw on exisnng VQ member relationships, are lower risk, require less staff skill 
development, and represent a nearly limitless market opporruniry. The argument against 
local loans is that because they suppon businesses that serve local markets and 
customers, they primarily Tesu It in redistribution and reshuffling of existing village assets 
and income. As a result. their actual economic development imp~ct on improving the 
total income and asset base of the rum! community is almost nonexistenL 
To date 1,655 :V1ELA entrepreneurs have received a total ofTk51 million. The 
OutStanding :-.tELA ponfolio for September was Tk28 million The average loan size for 
September was Tk37,000. The overall average loan size since the beginning of the 
program is significantly smaller at around Tk30,000. By the end of this year, the number 
of areas covered will have almost doubled from 27 to 51 branches where the MELA 
product is being offered. 17 of these 51 branches were just opened in November, so 
active lending has not yer begun. 
The program is expecled to continue to grow r.lpidly. The projection is that an additional 
49 branches will be opened by year end 1999, for a total of 100 branches covered-
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Management projects that the program will add 1 00 branches per year through 200 t until 
nearly all branches are covered. 
By the end of the year 200 l BRAC expeets conservatively that an average of 80 
entrepreneurs will be financed by MELA in 300 branches. This would require an annual 
disbursement ofTk960 million, assuming an average loan size ofTk40,000. BRAC's 
loan capital allocation for the MELA program is currently only Tk 100 miJlion, so this 
suggests a shortfall ofTk860 million (around $17 million). This is a very serious funding 
requirement. 
MELA Program Results to Date 
Currently, the MELA program is functioning as a high-end "VO Lending Program", in 
that loans are being made primarily on the basis of preexisting relationships, character 
and collateral- n<;>t business or enterprise analysis. September 1998 data shows that 94% 
of borrowers are VO members, and 80% of borrowers are women. Over 80% of loans 
have been to busineSses that have at least a 75% local customer base, and usually a 
customer base that is 100% local. The almost 100% on-time payment situation is more a 
Other Sectors 
Agro·Based 
Farming 
8% 
Food Processing 
18% Transport Sector 
3% 
Textile Sector 
27% 
function of preexisting PO-
borrower relationships, 
guarantors and "creaming" the 
borrower market than it is as a 
result of significant financial 
business analysis and risk 
management. The current 
portfolio relies almost totally on 
PO borrower relationships and 
not on any overall system of 
analysis and risk management. 
Colt<! 98 Industry This is not an unexpected 
21'1'. this . program status ai stage, as u 
is natural to build on an existing 
mode of lending and a known 
customer base. As discussed above, the challenge for BRAC Management is to deeide 
what is the purpose of the MELA program. Based on that policy decision. it will then be 
necessary to build the management expectations, skills and experience required to 
support the desired lending activity. 
We feel that MELA has great potential, but only if concerted program, staff and 
management development occurs. Should the MELA program choose to grow beyond 
the current retail sector "high end VO lending" program, it wiJl represent a departure 
from the traditional VO based BRAC lending program. As "such it will require significant 
management determination, staff training and discipline to achieve MELA's economic 
development potential. With significaru focus, it can be a strong tool to bring new 
income to the rural areas, respond to the root issues of poverty in the rural economy, and 
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counteract the economic drain from rural to urban communities. We believe that it is 
worth lhe effort, for it will chart a new course for BRAG for decades to come, pave the 
way for the BRAC Bank, and will address some of the underlying stnlctural economic 
issues facing rural communities. The current MELA lending practices and loan portfolio, 
however, are not targeted at enterprises Lhat have this economic development impact. 
MELA Program: Proposed Design Princioles 
Principle 1. There are two MELA Programs: MELA/Local and MELA/Export 
MELA can evolve to have two distinct loan portfolios within one loan program. The first 
(MELA/Local) is primarily a retail marke! lending program and the second 
(MELA/Export) is a primarily an economic development, wage employment creation 
program. These two portfolios are related, but quite different. 
The description MELA/Local is not meant to limit these loans only to retail firms, but to 
suggest that this category of loans is for businesses that sell to local customers, and thus 
function to recirculate income that already exists in the rural or village economy. These 
loans can be to all types oflocal retatl and service businesses. The key is who is the 
customer and is the sales income generated "new" to the community or just redirected 
income that already existed in the community. 
MELNLocal lending is a small business lending activity that could, in time, form the 
target market and core portfolio for the emerging BRAC Bank. The market demand for 
loans between Tk25,000 to Tk250,000 is nearly infinite relative to the available BRAC 
resources. The small service and retail leJ:\ding market, especially in rural communities, 
represents an extraordinary market opportunity for the BRAC Bank as it grows over time. 
It has volume, can be profitable, draws on BRAC's existing delivery system and 
competitive strengths. Over 90% of the current 1600 loans are MELA/Localloans. 
MELA/Export lending is aimed at value added businesses, i.e., businesses that have 
customers external to the village economy. The goal ofMELAJExport loans is the 
creation of"new income" and ''new jobs" for a region. The designation MELA/Export is 
not meant to restrict these loans only to manufacturing concerns, but to firms that sell to 
external customers and bring new income into the rural economy. The focus is 10 
increase the available income and assets of the conununity. This is an economic 
development and business development program, not just a lending program. This 
program is focused on growing businesses, providing management assistance, an.d 
targeting export oriented firms serving external markets. Less than 1 0% of the current 
MELA loans are MELNExpon loans.·. 
Principle l. The two MELA portfolios must have specific goals 
. . -.,_~ 
I 
While MELNLocal lending represents an important activity and may ultimately form the 
core portfolio for tbe BRAC Bank, the primary focus of the MELA program should be 
MELA/Export if maximum economic impact is desired. As suggested by the graph 
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below, this does not mean that there wilt not be any MELA/Localloans in the MELA 
portfolio, for these lower risk, local market loans can assist in overall portfolio balance, 
generating earnings, and risk management. 
This does mean, however, thai MELNLocaJ should not ultimately be the focus of 
MELA, and should not be more than 10% oftheMELA Economic Development lending 
program. That is the exact opposite of the current pon(olio, however, in that 
MELNLoc~tlloans compose 90% of the portfolio. MELAILocal could be a major 
component of the emerging BRAC Bank, but that is a different conversation. 
I Possible Grow th Path of MEl-A Export I 
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Principle 3. MELA is not aVO loan program; MELA staff need advanced slalls 
Lending criteri~ staffing, risk management, portfolio size, marketing and dism'burion. 
scale, and the need for additional business assistance can emerge to be MELA's 
distinguishing program characteristics. Until these differences are fully understood and 
incorporated in the management and operations of th.e MELA program, there is risk that 
the "VO experience" will contaminate the MELA program with inappropriate 
assumptions and risk management habits. 
The risk of a MELA portfolio is much greater than the VO portfolio, not only because the 
size of the loans will be 10-100 times greater than the normal VO loan. The primary 
focus of the MELA program is on more complex businesses that have to wrestle with 
much more difficult competitive and operational issues. Especially for MELA/ex.port 
lending, a MELA loan officer must have some understanding of regional markets, cost 
accounting, inventory management, longer cash flow cycles, and many other issu.es not 
relevant to retail lending. 
The MELA staffing mixture must be able to draw on a wide range of skills: formal bank 
lending skills, small business managemenl skills, market development and analysis skills, 
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accounting expertise, and other unusual skills and experiences. Without creating a sense 
of hierarchy, for BRAC to successfully navigate the risks inherent in this type oflending, 
it must staff MELA with the most highly skilled of its employees. It must also recruit 
from the outside and bring in lateral transfers, for it will be unable to grow some of the 
needed skills "from the inside". 
Assuming lbat the program grows to 100 branches by the end of1999, each with a 
moderately sized MELA Joan portfolio of eighty Tk40,000 loans, the total MELA 
portfolio will be Tk320 million. If having the appropriate lending and business 
consulting staff reduces the loan losses by only ll3 of I%, this represents an annual 
savings ofTkl million, more than enough to pay any expanded MELA staff costs. 
Principle 5. J,fELA/Local focuses on tile borrower: MELA/Export targets tile emplayee 
The first goal, best served by MELA!Local lending, is to directly serve a specific targeted 
constituency- women, low income people, village enterprises, the poorest of the poor, 
etc. The primary goal with MELAILocal here is to redistribute income and to provide 
access to capital to a particular group of borrowers <access to income and wealth). 
In contrast, !V[ELA/Export lending is not focused on the borrower, but rather on the 
economic impact and the ability of the firm to creaJ.e net new village income and net new 
jobs. This represents an enormous change for BRAC, in that BRAC has always focused 
on the borrower and not the net economic impact for a village/region. The entrepreneur 
may not be a woman. may not be poor, and even may have access to some existing bank 
credit. The entrepreneur, however, will create jobs and new income for the target 
population, however. The focus is not the borrower but rather on the ability of the finn to 
create new income and employment in the community. 
MELA/Expo~t loans ca11noc be resTricted to or focused on VO members. 
and in facJ VO members will ultimately fomr a very small percent of 
MELAI£tport loans. 17re reason is simple: there are few VO members 
that can or will create finns which sell to external cusiomers. To restrict 
or focus these loans on VO members will defeat the economic and brcome 
developmenr function of MELA/Export. 
Kev MELA Management Challem!es 
Setting aside the challenge of hiring new and retraining existing staff, management has 
two additional challenges: (a) creating policies that distinguish MELAJLocal from 
MELA/Expon; (b) creating incentives that will suppon the goals ofMELA. 
The incentive question is a particular challenge. Every existing MELA PO loan officer 
will be much more comfortable making loans to borrowers that they know, serving local 
markets and customerS for whom the risks are Jess and easier to analyze. Unfortunately, 
the "easier· loans will have little if any economic impact The task for MELA 
Management is to create incentives and guidelines that support BRAG's economic 
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development goals while at the same time acknowledging the pressures on the MELA PO 
to make local market loans. The second challenge is how to differentiate between the 
two types of loans: MELNLocal and MELA{Export. In some cases the distinction is 
clear, but in others it is not. 
A proposed preliminary rule to separate the two categories is as follows: A MELA/Export 
loan is to a business that generates over 85% of its sales revenue from customers who 
live in one of the Joflowing Bangladesh cities (Dhaka. Chitta gong. or other big urban 
areas) or outside of the country. Shorebank's proposal for this program is that it would 
be BRAC's intention that the MELAprogram will bring income and wealth/rom the 
richer and economically stronger urban areas to rural areas. not just transfer income 
between equally poor ruralthanas or districts even though they are a distance from one 
another. 
B~o\C will also have to provide guidelines to MELA POs regarding the types of 
businesses that create greater economic impact (i.e. those that export). There will be 
exceptions to this classification system but the burden will be on the .MELA PO to prove 
a specific loan is an exception to the rule so that it can be counted as one of the MELA 
PO's export loans to achieve their targets set by BRACHeadOffice. 
List of MELA Loans by Business Type (September 1998) 
Cumulative# of #of full-time E~uiv. Jobs per Average Loan/ 
Sector Enter rises Direct Jobs Ente rise Ente rise 
Textile 428 3109 7.3 Tk37,000 
Cottage 322 2055 6.4 Tk35,000 
Transport 65 145 2.2 Tk40,000 
Food Processing 271 1310 4.8 Tk43.000 
Agro-based farming 120 341 2.8 Tk39,000 
Retaii/Servic.e 449 1081 2.4 Tk37,000 
MELA Program Recommendations 
1. Create a Strategic Piau for MEL-\. The first task will be to create a strategic plan 
for the MELA program which answers the question: what is the purpose of!IIIELA? 
2. Focus MELA on i\'IELA/Export lending, to maximize economic impact on 
communities. To increase MELA's economic and wage employment producing 
impacr, we believe that the program should snictly limit itself solely to enterprises 
that sell to customers and markets outside of the village. IfBRAC focuses the :MELA 
program in this way, it will greatly increase its impact ou the village ~onomy and 
ultimately increase its ability to create wage employment jobs in the village by 200-
300%. It will also bring in new community income to suptxJrt the existing YO-
funded retail and service enterprises. The desired balance would be 90% 
MELA/Export. and 10% MELA/LocaJ. The emerging BRAC Bank could support 
MELA/Locallending, in that MELNLocal will fit the higher volume, lower risk 
requirements of the BRAC Bank. 
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Limiting the customer base for MELA will be a difficult task that will require very 
strict guidelines from rhe bead office, for the pressure on the MELA PO to lend to the 
much greater number of local retail and service businesses will be very strong. 
Stringently selecting borrowers by business rype and economic impact goes against 
BRAC's historical behavior, but that must be a MELA requirement ifBRAC desires 
to have any signilicant economic impact with this program and reach the very poor. 
3. Create a MELA Loan l>ortfolio Aging and Past Due Measurement process. The 
current system of P.ast due measures for the MELA program understates portfolio 
risk, for it is not distinguish between a loan that is 30 days past due and a loan that is 
120 days past due. This system of"Aging" the average portfolio outstanding (APO) 
is already in place for the standard VO lepding program, and needs to be 
implemented for the MELA lendinE program. 
4. Determine the purpose oftb.e l\1ELA program, and the resulting specific overall 
BRAC portfolio balance of MELA loans that are to be MELNExport and 
MELA/Local. Senior management must determine what the purpose of.MELA is to 
be, and what the resu lting MELA portfolio composition should be. Is MELA to be a 
high-end VO lending program, supporting the growth of retail and local market 
businesses? Or is MELA to be an economic development program that brings new 
income into the rural communities? Or (If both) what is the balance of these rwo 
goals? Once rhis determination is made, at least for 1999, then branch and regional 
targets must be set and management reporting procedures adopted. 
5. Synergy with the YO Program and Membership. BRAC's VO program should 
continue to support the local retail and service sector and the emerging MELA 
program should support primari ly the value-added productive sector. BRAC 
management should explore ways to link existing and new VO members to 
employment opportunities withMELA funded enterprises via an informal or formal 
job referra l service and potential loan covenants requesting that the MELA enterprise 
employ a certain percent ofVO members. 
6. :'\IEL\ Staff and Management Support. :vfELA must have a separate set of 
;;>rogram officers, lending instrurneJ;Jts, analytical tools, trnining programs, and 
management systems. This program cannot be seen or managed as a "big VO loan·· 
program. 
A VO Program Officer manages 500 loans and as a result is more of a .. systems" 
manager with brief contact with mimy borrowers and limited risk per borrower. In 
contrast. a MELA loan officer will manage only 30-50 loans, develop a much more 
in-depth relationship with the borrower, and have more substantial risk to manage.. 
VO staff must be skilled in communication. group management. and in handling 
many transaction~. A MELA Program Officer, in contrast, mu,st be understood as an 
entrepreneur with credit analysis skills, an unpaid consultant working with relatively 
few enterprises, a business-oriented problem solver, and a person whose goal is to 
Page 71 
help grow businesses and increase employment, not just make loans or manage 
payment transactions. It is understood that hiring and training this type ofMELA staff 
capacity will present BRAC with new challenges, but without this effort the MELA 
program will not succeed. We believe that with patience and focus, this is an 
extremely worthwhile and achievable taSk as BRAC moves forward. 
I • 
7. Revise $1Je current system ofloan cntegories and schemes. The current system of 
MELA loan categories are at best rnislea.ding, and should be revised to reflect the 
MELNLocal and MELA/export Joan di.visions. Under the current category of 
"Textile Sector", for instance, is both a hand loom weaver, a tailor and retailer of 
cloth. Given the desire to understand how MELAis serving either a local market or 
an export-producing enterprise, the current infonnation is not useful. 
7.2 Review status of the Urban Lending Program 
The Urban Lending Program is nolan RDP funded program. In 1996, BRAC made a 
· • . . de«ision to extend ;rs poverty alleviation program to urban areas with the intention of 
" • · -~" ..... ·:haVing an impact on urban poverty among squatters. The urban program has been 
modeled on BR..<\C'srural program (e.g. up to 40 members made up of groups of five 
comprise the urban organization (UO); first loan maximum is Tk4,000, meetings are 
biweekly, one PA will serve a maximum of 500 members, etc.). 
This urban program. which had 18,000 members in I 0 branches as ofNovember 1997, 
has doubled its membership base to 37,700 by October 1998. four hundred and seven 
slums housing 1.177 slum organizations or urban organizations (UO) are covered. 
BRAC plans to expand its Urban Lending Program in the future due to the increasing 
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incidence of poverty in and around major cities. A membership base of 150,000 is _ ( 
anticipated by 2003. Thirty branches will be cove.red with around 5,000 members per 
branch. This means an average annual growth of20,000 members a year. 
To fund 127,500 members (assuming 85% of 150,000 are borrowers), each with an 
average outstanding ofTk4,000 by 2003 means that a total of around Tk:Sl 0 million is 
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needed. The amoum increases as inflation is taken into account. Over the five year 
period, BRAC estimates that out of loan capitalization need ofTk570 million, Tk236 
million will be funded by savings. This leaves the total funding required to capitalize 
BRAC' s urban lending program at Tk457 million . 
BRAC Urban Program Projections 1998· 1999- 2000· 2001- 2002· 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
TPO Funding Required 40.000 92,000 122,100 145,200 171,699 
Savings Funded 17,360 27,880 41,800 47,880 54,000 
Net Funding Requirement 22.640 64.120 80,300 97,320 117,699 
Currently, approximately 37% of members are borrowers and the average loan 
outstanding is Tk3,000. The total saving to outstanding ratio is 85%. Excluding 
compulsory savings, the ratio is 79%. This is approximately double that ofRDP and 
means that the urban lending program can currently fund a major portion of its portfolio 
from savings. This is because loan sizes are still relatively small and most members are 
not yet borrowing. 
Urban lending staff has taken precautions to minimize the risk of"member flight" which 
often plagues urban lending programs (e.g: members should have lived in Dhaka for a 
length oftime etc.). BRAC is also coordinating more closely whh the government to 
ensure that it lends to squatter settlementHbat are "permanent'' in nature, rather than 
being so bject to forced removals. In spite of this effort, the overall dropout rate for 
members is 6o/o, which is higher than RDP levels for similarly young branches. 
Another difference between the RDP program and the Urban Developmem Program is 
that UO members are required to deposit double the amount into their savings accouru 
(i.e .. Tk40 per month). To dare, member!l.have on average been depositing !his amount 
monthly. We think that the risk of lendin~. urban borrowers is likely to be higher, and 
that the required savings will both be an ea:t!Y·.warning of member discipline problems. as 
well as serving as collateraL, Members ar~'{~ed to deposit 5% compulsory~avings 
against the.ir first loan vs. 2% of the total lO<ll'l"amount in RD:P for the same reasons. 
\vlille we agree with BRAC's approach of treading carefully as it feels its way in this 
new market, we believe that it is imponant to immediately set up comprehensive 
management. and analysis systems to monitor portfolio risk, management and cost 
recovery at the branches. There is a wealth of expertise within the RDP program that can 
be used to assist urban lending staff in this regard. The costs of not doing !his in the very 
near future will impede management's ability to prevent and catch problems early on. 
Finally, we think that the Urban Program could be more strategic in its goals and 
objectives from the outset. Accumulating expertise in specific high impact sectors. and 
establishing linkages between VO enterprises and UO enterprises so that both benefit are 
two examples. 
7.3 Report on repayments to RCP by BRAC for the HO building 
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BRAC borrowed Tkl50 million for the purposes of building the BRAC Center building. 
As per the agreement, Tk15 million was repaid to RCP in June of l997,1eaving Tk135 
million outsEanding. Since then, an additional Tk30 million has been paid in two six-
monthly installments with the next installment scheduled for December 1998. Currently, 
TKI 05 million remains outstanding. ( 
7.4 Update on RDP I RCP computerization 
The BRAC computerization program is a very important initiative, and we fully support 
it and in fact hope that it will be implemented as quickly as possible, for it is a key 
growth management tool for BRAC. 
All RDP and RCP branches now report on loan collections on an exception basis. This 
appears to be working very well as over 70% of members pay according to BRAC's 
standardized schedule (i.e. members make 23 bi-weekly payments of equal amounts over 
the year with the 15% interest rate factored into those payments). This means that only 
30% of transactions ,are ~'Ubject to the possibility of errors. Computer validation checks 
have funher reduced errors. BRAC's Computer Depamnent estimates that the quality of 
their information is now 99.5% error free. There have also been significant time and cost 
savings, both a the branch level and at the head-office MIS department. 
The other notable change is the progress that RDP has made wilh testing out its newly 
developed software in branches. 'l'en branches in one region now have computers. 
BRAC is expecting to computerize all branches within three years (rate of 100 branches a 
year). We believe the challenges will be threefold: 
I . Ensuring "problem computers" are quickly fixed 
2. Training branch staff in using computers to report 
3. Training branch staff to use tho information that they gather to more effectively 
manage their branches. 
Substantial thinking has already gone into the first EWO bullets above. However. we feel 
the real value to the branches lies in bullet# 3, and we encourage BRAC to develop a 
process to meet this need. Clearly, Regional Offices should also all be equipped with 
computers nnd software that enable regional managers to do detailed branchwise analysis 
of their region. This infonnation should then be summarized at the regional level for 
head-office use. Finally, an effective MIS system for rracking (and managing) individual 
and branchwise savings and sector activity still needs to be developed. 
7.5 Future of RDP Program post 2000 
By the year 200 I, the remaining 120 RDP branches· will be pan of the RCP program. 
RDP, as such, will no longer exisL All credit activities should be fully sustainable by that 
time and cross subsidy of the sector programs will be taking place. 
In terms of program growth from current levels, senior BRAC staff have indicated that 
they expect membership growth of all BRAC's credit programs to increase by around 
50% over the next three to five years . .RCP's growth will be fuelled by the intake of 
VGD members in existing RCP areas. As mentioned in our section on BRAC Bank, the 
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portfolio growth ofthe 330 RCP branches may be funded by BRACBank. It is unclear 
whether the $30 million capitallhat the donors put into RCPIBRAC Bank will remain 
inside RCP or the whether it will be used in some from or another (e.g. to buy 
debentures) in the Bank. The table below shows existing membership ofBRAC's credit 
programs, as well as our best guess (based on interviews) of future program growth. 
Clearly. growth of the nature will put accentuate already existing human capital needs 
lhat BRAC is facing. 
RDP 
RCP 
VGD (SO branches) 
MELA 
Urban 
Total 
June 1998 
570,000 
1,600,000 
300,000 
1,600 
35,000 
2,506,600 
June 2003 
2,900,000 
500,000 
24,000 
150,000 
3,874,000 
%Chane 
81% 
66% 
1,400% 
328% 
54% 
7.6 Review BRAC's implementation of Shorebank's 1997 
recommendations 
1. Portfolio Management · 
1.1. Credit PAs sltouldjoCWJ on savings mobilization wirlr the time now 
available by moving to biweekly meecmgs. 
Credit PAs have continued to focus on increasing the membership base of 
existing branches and reaching into poorer areas. Even so, BRAC agrees 
with 11:1 that there was not sufficient foc11:1 on savings mobilization, and 
savings growth bas been much too low during the year. 
1.2. To support good borrowers and economic growth, branch managers 
should be allowed to make more 1han one loan1o exceptional borrowers. 
Approximately 20% ofBRAC borrowers now have a sector program loan 
as well as a general loan. Generally there is a Tkl 0,000 cap but 
exceptions are made for faster growing entrepreneurs. 
1.3. Head office needs to be clear on its policy of raising the loan ceiling, and 
educate branch managers in the specifics, as weJl as provide credit 
evaluarron gwdelines. 
Branch managers have received training and are more aware of upside 
!leXJbilil)' with respect to loan size. Credit evaluation guidelines bave not 
been introduced. 
1.4. BrallCh managers with very je-.11 pas1 due loans and good borrowers 
should begin 10 allow longer lerm loans on a pilot basis. 
BRAC has allowed this to occur in its MELA program so that monthly 
payments of larger loan amounts are more manageable for borrowers. 
24% ofMELA loans have a term of 18 months and 13% ofMELA loans 
have a twenty-four month term. 
1.5. BRA-G should design specific lnethods to closely monitor rhe impact ofrhe 
shift to biweekly meelings on loan payments ond savings. 
BRAC's existing systems have been able to sufficiently ID:onitor the 
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impact of bi-weekly meetings. As a result, management was able to 
dedicate attention to the increase in delinquency that resulted in the initial 
months following the introduction of the system. Qualitative fieldwork is 
still needed to understand why weekly savings numbers have declined 
slightly. 
J. 6. The first loan size should be vigilantly trackeii as an indicaJor that JJRAC 
is reaching very poor borrowers. 
No separate report bas been set up to track the first loan size across all 
branches. We still recommend that this gets done and/or the median loan 
size of each branch is tracked and managed. 
2. Sector Program 
2.1. BRA C needs to set new activity targets for its sector programs based on 
the amount invested in the programs vs. the impact on individual and 
community income (i.e.., a return on investment concept). 
Targets or budgets for most sectors have not been reset. Activity levels 
and estimates of service charges due were tlllderestimated by 25% for 
pouluy, 15% for social foresuy and 57% for fisheries as a result of not 
setting more realistic targets. 
2.2. 77ze poultry program should prioriti:e e:dremely poor borrowers to 
maximi::e impact of this seczor on the very poor. 
This is occurring, especially among VGD members. 
2.3. Addiiional poultry hatcheries should be built in 1999 a11d 2000 to meet 
demand in this sector. 
The second poultry farm was completed in 1998 andBRAC is now in a 
posttion to consider new proposals for additional capacity to meet the 
outstanding demand for chicks. 
1A. Sericu/ture should continue its currem mode of no serious expansion 
pmding the proposed program and market evaluation. 
;-!o reeling centers were established in 1998 and sericulrure lending as a 
proportion of the total portfolio outstanding contracted further over the 
pasT year as anticipated. 
3. APO, Loan Loss Reserve and Delinquency Management 
3.1. Given the focus on the sectors programs. there should be an in-depth 
swdy of the business dynamics and possible delinquency problems in the 
following sectors: fisheries. sericulture and poultry/livestock. 
A srudy on sericulture will take took place in early 1999. No in-depth 
srudies of the fisheries and livestock sector have taken place yet. 
Both rural trading and food processing sectors need to split our into 
smaller and more revealing sub-sectors (especially rural trading at 50%) 
so that it can be a more effective management tooL Very small sectors 
can be combin.ed. Any business grouping that comprises more than I 0% of 
TPO should be separately classified to suppon concentration analysis, 
risk management, and the developmmt of technical assistance programs. 
Currently only rural trading and food processing comprise: more than 10% 
of the total portfolio outstanding. Since the type of rural trading done by 
members is very fungible and lines of trade change regularly, there is 
some doubt over the usefulness of this break-down. However, we still feel 
that some broad category breakdown may be helpful (e.g. rice paddy and 
.husking, livestock trading, vegetables, non-food items etc.). 
3.3. Housing loans should be made only after a formal review of rhe portfolio 
and clear guidelines are created to describe under what circumstances 
housing loans should be made, if at all. 
Although no formal housing lending policy exists. all BRAC managers are 
extremely wary about making housing loans due to the disproportionately 
bigh risk bistorically in the sector. The housing portfolio shrunk both in 
absolute terms as wen as a percentage ofTPO for the second year in a 
row. 
3.4. All NIBL loans should be plll into the 100 weeks APO category. 
BRAC does treat the riskiness ofNIBL loans as if they are in the 1 00 
weeks category and, for the first time ever, it wrote all these loans off in 
December 1997. On the January to November monthly report sheets, 
however, 1\TJ:BL still appears across all aging groups. We do not see this as 
a problem if provisioning is adequate as has been the case in the past, and 
these loans are wrinen off each year. 
3.5. Any loan that is 0\ler three years past due should be formally written off. 
but that should nat predude continuing collection efforts. Collection 
efforts need to be motivated and managed by branch and regional 
managemenl, not whether or not a loan is fomrally on the books or not. 
This was done. BRAC did their first official write-off in December 1997 
Branch staff still pursues the loans written off so as not to encourage 
active members to become less disciplined. 
3.6. Regular VO PAs should be rotated through a posicion of ''work-out 
specialist" so as to give as marry Plfs solid experience wilh loan 
collecrions and work-out sifllations. This is a lending skills developmenT 
activity. 
Not yet implemented. 
3. 7. A one-page reconciliation of the loan loss reserve needs to be created at 
the branch level every quarter. 1'7tis will require the production of the 
branclr level APO on a quanerly basis, a task that will be made easier 
when branches have computers. 
Tbis is likely to happen only once computers are installed in branches. 
Currently only ten branches have computers. 
3.8. .Branches should contribute to their loan loss reserve based on tlreir 
performance. rather than a flat 2% (which does not reward good 
perfonnance). 
As a first step, BRAC has trained all its branch managers bow to provision 
for risky loans at their branch. This way, they can see whether the 
allocated 2% of disbursements covers their losses. In furure, BRAC is 
planning to allocate contributibns to the loan loss reserve based on 
performance at branches. 
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3.9. A loan loss reserve expense of 4% should be set aside for the JyfELA 
program. 
This bas not yet been done as MELA POs are still lending to very low risk 
clients and are being extremely risk averse. Once more normalized 
growth and higher impact lending begins to take place in the MELA 
program, this reserve will need to be increased. 
·Savings Program 
4.1. Significant additional and much more formal research and market testing 
of new savings products is rCI[uired. "Mistakes" in this oreo wiff have 
severe implications for IJRAC 's fUnding and liquidity situation. An in-
depth study of consumer and saver preferences needs to be made. 
Not mucb done in this area over the past year, other than training branch 
managers in the importance of mobilizing savings. The RDP Director is 
prioritizing this area for 1999 and bas already given thought to differem 
p.roduct types, etc. 
4.2. Bra.nch managers need to be directed to follow the current HO policy 
guidelines on savings withdrawals or the guidelines need to be changed. 
The discontinuity between practice and guidelines is a issue chat needs to 
be resolved. 
Training of branch managers on BRAC's savings policy bas taken place. 
Incentives and performance measures to reinforce this still need to be 
instirutionalized. 
4.3. Assuming a serious research program. a range of products with differem 
pricing and mo.Jurities should be explored. Products should reflect 
consumer preferences. and incorporate issues of location, liquidity. 
safekeeping and incerest rate pricing. 
BRAC plans to do this in 1999. 
4.4. Customer and PA education on the benefits of saving should be increased. 
and conJ!ected to BRAC's overall organzzational and development 
strategies. 
Thts is beginning to take place, but further buy-in from bTliilch managers 
reinforced by incentives and performance management tools is needed 
before PAs get the message from their seniors. 
4.5. A more sophisticaJed syscem of savzngs trac/..:ing. management, and 
forecasting s(IVings behavior needs to be developed to reflect the 
mcreasing imporzance of the savings programs to BRAC'sfinanczal health 
and development impact. This needs to be tracked at the branch and 
regional levels. not just at the head office level. 
Not yet done. 
5. Brn.nch Profitability, Sedor and Operations Managemeut 
5.1. The current sysiem of classifYing branches year-wise is becoming less and 
less relevant as the branches mature and the non-age related differences 
and dusters become more significant. A formal research effort needs to 
explore different methods of categorizing branches based on type of 
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lending, regional economy. risk and portfolio characteristics, membership 
behavior and status, sectoral focus, local demographic pattenJS, etc. 
While year-wise categories may be retained for more tecltnical or 
historical reporting reasous until the end of the RDP IV plan period, a 
more powerfUl and revealing category system needs to be developed and 
made the primary measurement caJegory. 
BRAC has asked Shorebank: to he.lp lhem address this issue. We are 
presenl.ly working with BRAC to see if a weighted rating based six key 
fi.nancia.l ratios and one "poverty-reach" indicator makes sense. 
5.2. Fixed dates and tighter payme/lt systems for sector program payments 
must be tukJpted. Past due d~arges should be fTacked. as with the APO 
system, at the branch level. 
BRAC has transferred some of its top regiona.l managers to bead up the 
operations managemen1 of the sector programs, with an increased 
emphasis on efficiency and cost recovery. Better MIS tracking of inpulS 
and money flows still needs to occur. 
5.3. The performance of sector staff should be based not only on percent of on-
tune collections but also 011 quality (APO) of past dues. 
Not happening yeL 
5.4. Branch staff should revise activity targets on .a quarterly basis in 
conjunction with the head office. The current targets for activity levels 
are too low and targets for cost recovery are too high. 
Not done for most sectors. 
5.5. Payment systems for sector services should move increasingly to a "value 
added" basis in which the member pays for services they feel add value. 
BRAC agrees in principle and is in the process of thinking about ways that 
this can take place. For example, BRAC could train and help establish 
sector specialists in the community. These specialists could then market 
their own services to group members who pay on.ly for services requested 
and received. 
5.6. 17rirteen specific teclmical and assumprion changes are proposed for 
BRAC'sjinancial model. 
Most of rhese changes have been made in the financial projection model 
which, according ro the AccountS Department, is now far more useful to 
BRAC. 
5.7. Management at HO and regional levels should rrack not.only the total 
yearwise branch trends of the average of the jive management ratios, but 
should also do a branch-wrse trend distribution to t.mderstand the 
distribution of branches across the management variables. 
BRAC RDP has developed the capacity to do these branchwise trend 
reports although it has not yet implemented them on a regular basis. 
Impact performance measures are still done through lhe Monitoring 
Department. 
6. Management Systems and Human Resources 
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6.1. A Training and Development section should be created that focuses 
specifically on economic development and business research as well as 
nwnaging. developing and providing specialized craining 10 RDPIRCP 
employees. This needs to be staffed with experienced staff from inside or 
ouiSide BRAC that will have credibilil)l willr tire field staff and an 
understanding of BRA C's strategic direclion and I he importance of human 
capital development, as well as the necessary technical skills. 
BRACIRDP is building irs own internal training capacity to meet the 
growing specialized needs of building the skills ofRDP staff(one person 
has been hired). A research and development capacity has not yet been 
established. 
6.2. Branch managers should be given training on how to grow and develop 
their staff effectively. 
Around 350 branch managers participated in training courses in which a 
module was dedicated to staff development, motivation and management . 
. Senior management needs to reinforce lhese practices by growing branch 
managers themselves, as well as measuring the11erfonnance of branch 
managers not only on financial indicators, but on staff development 
indicators as well. 
6.3. To increase the focus 011 branches as enlerprises. Bran.ch Managers 
should submit on a quarterly basis to the head office a report of key 
indicators (detail in Review) with explanation of any divergence from 
plan. Regional Managers should do the same on a consolidated basis. 
Head office should provide branch and regional managers with a 
standardized set of indicators to evaluate team and individual 
performance. 
A set of indicators has been developed. Now th.at almost all the branch 
managers have received training, it is possible to institutionalize these 
reports quarterly. The reports will be sent out ior completion at the end of 
the first quarter of 1999. 
6..+. A much deeper and more detailed system of tracking and management of 
employee skills. experiences and C(ll'eer growth needs 10 be developed. To 
increase its leverage and economic development impact, BRAC should 
integrate its PSEs and Sector programs under one program head for each 
section. For e:wmple. one person should head up everything to do wich 
sericulture. 17re programs within this portfolio. however. should still be 
cracked separately for financial and development impact reasons. 
Not implemented. Needs further thoughL 
6.5. Reponing on financial and other key indicators needs inrpr.ovement in tile 
PSEs to allow managers to better analyze their performance. This should 
be done in the field at the PSE level. 
Not done yet 
6.6. We recommend the creation of a BRAC RDP_IRCP Executive level 
"Growth Management Workgroup .. that can focus on the issues and tasks 
necessary to resolve as BRAC continues its rapid growth. 17ris group 
would f= on internal, operations and management issues. not external 
. ' !' .; .. " t .• ., 
strategic development issues. 
Not done. 
7. Other Donor Concerns 
7.1. We support the computerization process. and encourage a special focus 
011 the non-hardware training and management systems implications of 
this project. 
The computer department'has given this issue senous consideration and is 
monitoring non-hardware needs in its pilot project. 
7 .2. We recommend tlze approval of the Q)'ganized Seed Production Project. 
The project was implemented and was operational in the first half of 1998. 
7 .3. To creaze an economic impact that justifr.es the risk and the program. we 
recommend that the MELA program focus exdusively on value-added, 
productive sector businesses that sell to a customer base outside of the 
community, and not lend to local service and retail businesses. 
On a second visit to BRAC after last year's annual review, we concluded 
that although the above recommendation should stand as is as an end goal, 
it is bener for MELA POs to gain experience in this new type oflending 
by starting with lower risk businesses. These enterprises are mostly local. 
less complicated, and do nol have substantial leverage potential. This is 
what has occurred to date. After additional MELA PO training which will 
occur in early 1999, there will be an incremental shift to lending to the 
value-added productive sector. 
7A. MELA should coordinate with the VO program to suppon wage 
errrploymsnt opportWiiiies created by MELA borrowers. 
This is not yet happening in any foiiDalized way although MELA staff 
report that local hires are the main source of labor for the businesses. 
7.5. 1'.1ELA must design a separate set of/ending instruments, managemelll 
gwdelines, tmming programs and analytical10ols that are aimed at this 
program. The MELA program cannot be mtmaged as a "Big VO loan ·· 
program. T1ll.s will require trainmg of existing staff and the hiring of new 
staff from outside of BRA C that has strong enpepreneurial backgrounds. 
Due 10 lack of appropriate skills among MELA fOs, the program is to 
dale being managed, by and large, as a Big VO Program. This wtll begin 
10 change once the POs receive training. However, more fundamental 
changes are needed before MELA can become a high impact program. 
7.6. We recommend the approval of the modifted RDP bwiget. 
J 
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8. Summary of Major Shorebank 1998 Recommendations 
In Shorebank's 1997 Financial Review, we made over fifty specific recommendations for 
changes and possible improvements in BRAC operations and policies. While we believe 
that level of detail is useful, we will employ a different strategy this year conceming 
recommendations. In the body of the text, we have included in most sections a section on 
suggestions and recommendations. We have also continued to incorporate many of our 
1997 recommendations that still need action. What will be summarized here, however, 
are just the major twenty five recommendations. 
1. Portfolio and Credit Management 
1.1. As in 1997, we suggest that BRAC create an R&D department to work solely 
within the credit program. There is a significant oeed to understand the risk and 
credit dxnamics of specific sectors and rypes of loans, but no resources to explore 
those questions . This is especially important with respect to the MELA program, 
but also applies to the general credit program. 
1.2. We also suggest, again, that BRAC should create a dedicated credit and 
finance training unit that designs and implements credit, savings and business 
analysis training for RDP/RCP staff. There are enough RDP staff to support a 
continuous tra.ioi:og and human capital "investment" process. This is a growing 
need, and a growing gap. 
1.3. Credit evaluation guidelines should be created that make clear what branch 
managers should or should not do with respect to refinancing, loan size, required 
savings balances, and the specific issue of the flood credit issues. 
1.4. Branch managers with good borrowers and excellent overall credit history 
should be able to extend the terms ofloans. This is ao optiop that will support 
development needs. and if managed well will allow branches to support a larger 
TPO \vithout the transaction costs imposed by shorter-term notes. This should be 
managed on a pilot basis. 
1.5. Fi.rs! loan levels should be traeked, to understand more clearly what 
population the credit programs are involving, i.e., the poorest borrowers. 
l.6. Overall. the most important task for the MELA program is to invest in 
"human capital", and to significanrly upgrade the training and skills of the 
MELA POs. In general, we would recommend that BRAC not si~mificanllv 
grow either the :vt:ELA portfolio or the number of branches covered. The risk of 
the program at this point is still too high, and the skills of the POs are still roo 
limited. The MELA program needs to develop a strategic plan that determines 
what type of lending it wants to do, what level of economic impact., what staff 
training and product research is necessary, and what level of funds it needs. 
Expansion of the MELA program should proceed very slowly, for it will be very 
easy to get "ahead of' the existing strategy and skill base, and run into serious 
credit problems. We suggest freezing the current number ofMELA branches and 
grow the portfolio very slowly in targeted sectors by only deepening the 
outstanding portfolio in the existin~ branches, rather than expanding the number ""'· • .. ·~'f.i>l 
~ · .. 
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of branches and number ofMELA PO's. The current level of staff experience 
and expertise of MELA PO staff is not adequate to support the current program. 
let alone a significantly expanded program. The investment that needs to occur 
over the next 12 months is in the MELA loan officers, not the financial portfolio. 
First, MELA must decide on a strategy and then significantly strengthen lending 
staff expertise and sectoral focus. After that point, BRAC should consider 
expanding the number of branches beyond the current .fifty, but not until the 
current "product research" and staff training and development is finished. It may 
well be possible to grow the total MELA portfolio at the existing branches, but 
we would recommend against expanding this program to more branches until the 
concept and risk management process is proven out at the current branches. The 
risk for losses in this progr8111 is still very high, and the collective experience in 
this type oflending is still very low. 
2. Savings Program 
2.l. BRAC should create a senior position at Head Office that is focused solely on 
the design, implementation and growth of the savings program. Each region 
should also have a staff person that focuses only on the design, growth and health 
of the savings program·within that region. Without this single-minded focus, it is 
much less likely that the savings program will grow and provide the capital that 
BRAC needs to grow and to support its membership. 
2.2. A mvch more explicit and computerized system of tracking individual savings 
behavior needs to be installed, for the stlillJJlary level savings data is insufficient 
to either yield program insights or to insure that savings are being managed 
effectively and correctly. 
2.3. Additional and more formal research needs to be implemented 'vith respect to 
understanding member's savings preferences. lt is likely that BRAC will have Lo 
offer a range of sa"ings products, and the necessary product and consumer 
research needs to be intplemented. 
2.~. Credit PO's should focus more on savings mobilization, under the direction of 
the regional savings specialist. 
3. APO, Loan Loss Reserve. and Delinquency M anagement 
3_1. Using the resources of the newly created RDP/RCP applied research finance 
group. there needs to be research of the financial and credit dynamics of the 
various sectors, so that more insight can be gained into the reasons for higher 
levels of delinquency and losses in. some sectors. This is a business, marketing 
and financeonented research effort-not social science. The current BRAC 
research unit does not have the business and finance experience necessary. 
3.2. A new, more informari.;e system of loan sector classification needs to be 
created. The current system is both inaccurate and large classifications such as 
rural trading are such a large perc~ge of the total portfolio as to be not useful 
for understanding varying levels of risk. 
4. Branch Sustainability 
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4.1. There needs to be a continued push on branch managers to think of their 
branch as a sustainable "proiit center". Tlris implies they should tum in a 
business plan for their branch every year, with projected costs, revenues, assets 
and liabilities, and the associated "bot!om line" oflevel of sustainability. This 
plan should include both the credit as well as the sector programs. Regional 
managers should, in tum, create a regional "busines,s plan" that shows the level to 
which that region wiU be sustainable during the coming year. Branch and 
re~onal managers should continue to receive training and reinforcement of this 
perspective of managing their branches. 
4.2. Branch managers should project their financial ratio performance for the 
coming year, as well as speciiic bu'dget items and savings and credit targets. 
4.3. The branch computerization system should be implemented as quickly as 
poSSible, for only through this process will branch managers be able to access the 
most effective information necessary to enable them to manage their branch as a 
profit center, as a business. 
5. Sector Program 
5.1. The bll$iness model that should be adopted is that BRAC is moving towards 
privatizing as much of the sector and TA program as possible. Current data 
collection efforrs, and the raining of staff, should occur within that framework. 
5.2. The sector program should move to be a demand-driven not a supply-driven 
system that is managed collectively along with the credit progratn by branch and 
regional managers. 
5.3. The quality of the sector APO needs great improvement, and should be 
supported by an improved sector progratn design, and supporting MIS 
information. Appendix 1 makes some speciiic suggestions as to program and 
MIS design. 
6. Growth Management 
6.1. A senior "Growth Management" Task Force should be created and staffed, 
and it should iirst implement a serics'of research efforts designed to diagnose the 
most critical areas where rapid growth is impacting on the BRAC organization. 
With the suppon of senior management, it should then help to design and 
implement responses to lhese issues. 
6.2. BRAC will encounter funding and liquidity issues for the foreseeable future, 
and thus needs an improved process of managing capital requirements and 
allocation of capital between programs. This should be managed by Head 
Office, but every effon should be made to educate regional managers as to the 
process of capital flows within BRA C. so that they can help manage !.his issue-
during the flood response time, as well as afterwards. 
6.3. The computerization program should be accelerated as much as possible, for it 
is a key growth management tool, and a key tool to support savings generation. 
6.4. We recommend that to cope with the signiiicanl capital growth needs that 
BRAC will experience over the coming years (RCP, Urban Lending, MELA. 
flood impact, BRAC Bank, etc.) that it designate a full time staff person whose 
only job is to raise capital for BRAC. 
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Appendix 1: Notes on an MIS System for Sector Programs 
This is a special section on a particular area of concern to Donors and BRAC 
Management, that of cost recovery of the sector programs, and what might be done to 
design a management and MIS system that could help improve the current situation. [( is 
not meant to be a full report or analysis, but only some notes that may be helpful. 
The cost recovery for the sector programs is running at 19%. The target for 1998 was 
that30% of all sector program costs should be covered. RDP management believes that 
it needs a good MIS system to be able to effectively reduce costs and increase revenues. 
We agree, but believe that before designing and implementing an MIS system, the 
underlying design of cost recovery, service charge collection practices, assumptions 
about customer demand and value added, and staffing should all be examined before 
implementing an MIS system. We believe that the current system has flaws that need to 
be addressed before BRAC begins designing a system to measure costs, revenues and the 
impact of the sector program. 
While we recognize that we have nor done in-depth research into the sector program this 
visit, we have given the topic serious thought. What follows is a summary of our 
preliminary views as well as a set of measures that BRAC can begin to lD1plement 
immediately to increase cost recovery in the sector programs. We believe this is critical 
for the long-tellD sustain ability of the sector program. 
Gujding Principles 
+ Demand for technical assistance and advice should be demand driven, not supply 
dnven. At the momenL it is "supply push" rather than "demand pull." 
+ Payment for inputs (e.g . seeds, chicks, prawn culture, feed, DFL) should always be at 
the pomt of transaction. In other words, the participant pays cash immediately on 
receipt of product. 
• Payment for teclmical assistance or advice should take place at the point of 
rransaction if !he service is privatized (e.g. in the cas7 of the Para-Vets), or at the 
closest feasible point to it (e.g. at the first biweekly credit vo meeting following the 
delivery of the advice). 
+ All transactions in the sector program shouid be monitored for each participant 
through a MIS system. A manager should be able to pull up a participants record and 
see what type of advice she has been requesting, whlll quantity of inputs she ordered, 
how much she paid for the inputs, and whether she is current on her service charges 
payments. The manager should also be able to pull up summary information of these 
variables for the branch. 
Our vision forth~ Year 2000: Privatization of Technical Assistance Provision 
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Going forward, BRAC needs an excellent MIS system which tracks what advice 
members request, what inputs they find most valuable, and what services they are willing 
to pay for, etc. From one perspective, BRAC must engage in deep and intensive 
"business planning research" over the coming two years, so that it wiU be in a position to 
privatize as much as possible of its sector programs after the year 2000. 
Between now IUld 2000 
Apan from the very important task of preparing itself to be the Franchisor of"Growing 
Successful Fanners," BRAC needs to address sector program activity, cost recovery and 
impact on participants. All three are directly related to one another. If a value-added 
service is delivered, members will pay for that service (i.e. cost recovery improves) and 
existing members will expand their business andnew members will want to join the 
program. Increased impact on members thus correlates positively with increasing activity 
and coverage. 
The only source of direct revenue for the sector program is service charges. The premise 
underlying service charges is deceptively simple: Members get value added, make more 
income, and are therefore willing to pay for the service they receive. If the customer is 
satisfied, she is likely to pay without coercion (e.g. threatening not to disburse a loan to 
her because she is delinquent on her service charge payments). The challenge for BRAC 
is to devise a system where payment for services is directly related to benefits received. 
Jc is a flawed syscem char continues ro assume that all panicipanrs who require mputs will 
commual!y need secror specialist advice. Alter a chick rearer has learnt about 
disinfectant, vaccinations, feed and keeping the area warm, there is a lim.ited amount of 
value that further technical advice can deliver (unless there is a change in technology). 
The same applies to a fish farmer who has learnt what different types of fish can be 
farmed in the same pond and what the water balance should be, and how to drain and 
clean her pond etc. Similarly, a vegetable grower can also learn whar there is in know 
about vegetable fanning in a couple of visits. 
We believe that members will request advice and pay for iJ, where it adds value. 
Technical advice should be demand or market driven, not supply driven as it is currently. 
There are enough examples that PAs and Poultry Workers can point to show the value of 
their work. Paniciparus should pay for their service charges at the bi-weekly meeting 
after the service is due. . 
It is likely that BRAC will be able to cut .. advice giving staff' significantly in all its 
sector programs where it is not adding value. , Ultimately, as discussed above, we believe 
it is better for BRAC to train and certify sector workets who can then carry out the 
services, rather than keeping a possibly bloated staff on its payroll. 
.. . 
. . -
. 
• 
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In sum, it is likely that the nwnber of sector participants that \\~!I use technical ndv•ce. if 
given the choice, ts far lower than BRAC's current assumptions. We believe members 
should be given this choice. Members only benefit by paying only for services they feel 
add \'alue. BRAC benefits by cutting surplus staffwhe.re value is not being added, and 
by ensurtng that only !ugh quality services are delivered, thus increasing the program's 
developm~nt impacL 
Members who do not pay for services that they requested should not receive assistance in 
furure. Clearly, where there is a negative externality or a risk to others (e.g. if a member 
refuses a vaccinauon and a disease may spread. exceptions should be made). 
·when to collect? 
.'\sa general rule, we believe thatlhe point of transaction (or as ciose to ir as possible} is 
the best time to collect on tile service delivered. Tius ts sometunes not feasible where 
potential ior corruption exists. We have developed a rough ser of draft suggestions wtlh 
respec: to BRAC's Pouln: Program. which could be used to further de,·elop a 
comprehens1ve reponmg system for all RDP's sector programs. 
Type of 
Sen1ce 
Product 
Da:· Old 
C:hick and 
Feed 
Adqec on 
Chick 
Renrine 
Expample: Suggested Changes to Poultry Progr:un 
Service Charge Co!lecrion Process 
Benefit to 
Portitipnnt 
!·h~h:: quoin-;. 
::uck lnC fe.C 
Lower C.nl;:k-
:vto:uiu:y 
f·bgmor ?,-,c~ 
te!c:neG 
Service Chnrge Collection Point 
Cum:n· process- ... : pomt of cmdc or feed purchase. Crtdlt s>~es 
allowed b;· ~o= :>ron=n =nagus. Pncng ior lughcr qtl.lilif> not 
mduaea (~I 
Susne.red: At pnm: of cluck purchase or feed purch:u• ;a qunlJr,-
"tee" should be m:iud:d m pnce of cluck\ Only cash sules 
\um:nt Proces!\: Member pays for stn:1ces whrther .sh:: requesec 
asstsmnce or not. Payment. somrtunes occurs only after 8 weeks ~\ ht:n 
chtt!{l. are sold Payment urkes plot: at VO ttedlt me:tmg II 
payment rrussed. S<:!:lor PA mr> to col!e.:1 at pQl'Dtlj)ant s hou;c 
Su~sosted: Once monthly Ill VO cred>t m~enng ti sen1ce hns o::n 
rtque<u:d !ll1d receiVed by VO membe1. ld:~Liy, thti ~cc should be 
pnv~ozed and paymen1 should go chrectly <o the pro,rydc:r. BR."'C 
should oniy be responsible for lrilUU11g :md a:mfymg prov1ders of the 
sen-lee. 
\ · ac:t:m:ttion.s Lower Cum:m Precess c; ffi::e: Scrvtce IS Pnvatm:d. P~ymcnt dire:_~ly :o 
Parave; for Sen·•~• BRJ\C's role IS onl~ to morutor tysu:rr. to easure 
q~lil)' rnputs are provided. 
~1oroiny 
The same logic applies to all inputs that are supplied to all the sector programs. Cash 
should be patd on rece!Jll of the mputs ane a system at the branch should identtiy every 
indi~duallr!U1Saction that takes place. when it was prud for, and what quantity was 
delivered. The branch should price a fee for dJstributing higher quality seeds (or chicks) 
into the cash price that the VO member pays. 
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Similarly, any advice that is not yet privatized should be paid for at the biweekly meeting 
following the giving of the advice. BRAC needs to devise a standard rate per advice-
giving visit that members can afford. Only members that request the advice, presumably 
because they find it useful, should be served. IfBRAC determines that paying at the 
biweekly meeting following service delivery is not feasible, we recommend that an 
alternative system is set up which is tells members clearly when payment for advice 
requested and delivered is due (e.g. the first biweekly meeting following the harvest, or 
the middle of the harvest, rather than some time over the next three months). It is 
imponant to set up tight collection systems so that members know when tlleic payments 
are due. 
Measur ing service charges delinquency 
Collections of service charges should be measured against the real amount due (based on 
activity), as opposed to the targeted amount which branch staff (and head-office) are 
currently using on a regular basis. Activity variances can be measured separately. In line 
with setting up clear guidelines for service charge collection, past due service charges 
should be tracked over time as per the APO model (e.g~ 0 weeks, I -4 weeks, etc.). 
Unless activity is accurately m::asured (and this does not seem to be the case to date), it 
wiTI be difficult to project service charge collections and income from inputs sold. 
Measuring activjrv 
Activity in the poultry, sericulture and agriculture, and :fisheries sector (prawn only) can 
be measured by the number of members who purchase inputs using cash, as well as the 
quantity of inputs being purchased. Both indicate program growth. If the number of 
members who purchase the inputs grows, clearly more members are part of the program. 
lfthe amount of inputs purchased grows (even if the number of members does not), it 
indicates that the more enterprise is getting done. This is also a positive indicator. 
The number of members who Tequest technical advice frollJ PA staff and pay for it is a 
secondary measun: that can be used to track activity. Similarly, the size of fish ponds or 
agriculturalll1!cts of land being farmed can also be used as secondary measures of 
activity. 
Before a MIS system is devised, RDP management shou.ld set clear guidelines for each 
sector. Branch and regional managers should observe the standard ratios I guidelines that 
BRAC HO managementsets in conjunction with them. 
• Number of sector participants: P A. The number of sector participantsiP A should 
assume that only a portion of participants buying inpUIS will continually want the 
same technical advice from the sector PA). This is very different to the credit 
program where all members are either saving anclfor borrowing. Our guess is that 
most participants will continue to want inputs and loans but continual advice is not 
necessary. 
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• Number of sector participants: Poultry Worker (Same argument as above applies 
here) 
• Number of Poultry Workers: PA 
• Number of PAs: PO 
• Number of Any other sector specialist (e.g. trainer): sector participants 
• taka per_technical advice visit in response to a request for that advice. 
• Standard training cost (package) per new PA: budget guideline per PA 
• Update on training for PAs: a budget guideline per P A should be set. MIS 
crosschecks should be set in place to check whether PAs, in fuel, did receive training. 
Our interviews have revealed that branch staff and/or training staff may be claiming 
training costs from Head-Office that may not have been spent on ttai.ni.ng staff. 
Measuring Activity 
• A monthly summary repon prepared by the branch manager for each sector for the 
regional manager should contain some version of the fo I lowing 
• Number of active participants this month (members that purchased inputs) 
• Percent of change in number of active participants from previous month and analysis 
of reason for the change 
• quantity of inputs bought for cash (both uruts and in Taka) 
• average quantity bought per member (both units and in Taka) 
• Percent of change from previous month and analysis of reason for change 
• Number of members requesting technical advice this month 
• Percem of cbange from previous month 
• Number of members receiving technical advice this month (based on payment for 
services received). 
• Percent of change from previous month 
• description of type of advice given by ser:vice providers 
Measurin2 Delinouencv 
Branch mana2ers should submit a form monthly to regional managers that identifies their 
recovery of s;rvice charges. BRAC could build on the follo,ving format to measure the 
occurrence of delinquency and the aging of service charges outstanding. 
PoultrY Sector Ja,n Feb Mar Aor Mav Jun Jut Dec 
Projettod Budget of SC For this 
month 
l'roj«tod Activity for this month 
Actuai Acl:lvlty this month 
Van:ante from projwed activity W•> 
SC due this month baJed on aaual 
activity 
Service Char~:es 1"6llied this month 
bued on llctivity 
Tw Overdue for this month 
Dut/rufu.ed (~•) 
% Change from previous month 
Tol21 Taka O•·erdue (including from 
previous months) 
Cumulative % of service charges over 
3 pe.riDds overdue 
Cumul-.tive tllka over three periods 
overdue. 
• 
Suii1JI1Jlry Sheet of Collection/Due 
SC re.alized 
ISC due 
Poultry 
Livestock 
S. Forestry 
Sericulture 
Agriculture 
Total 
Target Based on Actual Activity for 
Current period 
Ql 2 QJ 4 
Tk%11c%Tk%Tk% Tic % 
Variant.e 
from 
Ta et 
T1c % 
Ql 
%Cost 
Recove 
'tk % 
Sample Singie-Sector Quarterly Expense Report 
Cost 
St~fr Salary 
Travel and Traospon 
SWfTrainlng 
PA Salary 
VO Tntining 
Tot:ti.Expenscs 
sen;ce Charges 
Realized 
% of Cost Recovery 
Budget 
for 
Year 
Period I (Qu.rterly) 
Tk % change from prev period variance 
from budget 
(1) 12) 13 
Varlane• 
from 
Period 2 
Etc. 
Quarterly Cost Recovery Summary Sheet for All Sector Programs 
Ex eoditure 
Poultry 
Livestock 
Fisheries 
SodJll Forestry 
Sericulturo 
Agriculrure 
Totol Cosu 
Rnenues (Service Charges 
ReJlllzed) 
Poultry 
Livestock 
Fisheries 
Sodal Forestry 
Sericulrure 
·~-1) ~, • 
. . 
Bud~et for Year Poriod I Period 2 Period 3 EIC:. 
I 
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Agrkulture 
Total .Revenues 
Sector Progl"llm Ddieil 
~. Cost Recovery 
Valjdirv Checks 
The logistics or other suppliers of inputs 9r services (e.g. the T ARC) should also send a 
monthly repon to the regional manager of what quantity of inputs were delivered, when 
they were ;equested, when they were delivered and how much taka is due. 
Performance measurement of staff 
The perfoanance of sector staff at the branch should be based not only on the percentage 
of on-time collections, but also on the quality of the past dues (i.e. bow many weeks 
overdue etc.). Branch management should be measured on progressive improvement of 
cost recovery ratios of their sector programs as well as increases in activity. 
Systems should be; set up to ensure that costs claimed for training are valid. Some staff 
interviewed told us that there may be a problem. Umealistic targets for head-office staff 
or regional managers should not set sector growth. In the past, one of the reasons that 
branch staff supplied chicks on credit to participants was because they had to get a supply 
of chicks out the door and there was not sufficient demand for them. Unless there is 
vig~lant tracking of the number of chicks/other inputs delivered at a branch (vs. the 
number that the PSE said they sent), credit sales will be very difficult to monitor. 
Participants should not be coerced (e.g. told they will not get a loan) if they do not 
request either inpu1s or technical assistance. 
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Examples of other summary of types of sector information 
that should be regularly monitored: 
(l) Flow ofinputs from Supplier to Br.mch 
#Chicks I input #Chicks Taka due to Taka poid to Taka 
requested and date of delivered to supplier <UJd supplier (and overdue to 
request. Brunch and 
date. 
date due date paid) supplier 
.J.Iso% change from Also% 
previous month variance from 
request 
{2) Flow of inputs to members: Flow of taka to br2nch 
II Chicks rmput sold Taka due from Taka coUected Taka overdue Cumulative 
to sector particip3llls sector from sector thlsmonth Taka 
(cash sale) participams participants overdue 
Also % clnmge from Also% 
previous molltb realized/ % due 
(3) Indicators of sector progrllm activity 
Total# Acth·e ;# o.f new # drop-outs (no Total-il Active %Change 
Partictpants (active = members mputs over past Parnotpams at from 
buying inputS) "' (r.cemng 2 months) end of month previous 
be!tinnm• of month inputs) month 
{4) lndlcators of technical advice pro,·ision: demllDd, supplv and pavmcnt 
11 Members ;, ),!embers Taka due for Taka realized % Real12.ed 
•equcsting advice who received advice rendered for services for current 
(request could take ad\· ice for services reod<Ted period/due 
place at b1-weekly requested delh•ered thot (exduding forc=t 
VO meeting) during month month. arre.JIS>.nd period. 
including Also gtve 
Also.% chonge Also tot:ll taka = taka from previous due for past pnym.rnts overdue 
month services 
rendered hut 
sn11 WJoaid . 
Aging of 
Taka 
Overdue 
(need 
separate form 
as per credit 
APO) 
Aging of 
Taka 
Overdue 
(need 
separnte fonn 
with fl Taka 
plus % l 
Agmg of 
service 
charges due 
(need 
separate fonn 
as per APO} 
1 Ar a US exchange rate of 49 Taka to the dollar, total principal o.utstanding was US$ 78 
MM in June 1998. 
2 An even more sensitive indicator of declining borrower discipline and potential 
repayment problems is when borrowers begin to neglect to deposit thei:r compulsory 
weekly savings at VO meetings. 
3 The same number calculated for September 1998 including the VGD program is Tk38 
million. 
4 The same number calculated including the VGD program for September 1998 = Tk137 
mjiJion. 
s MELA management only tracks the total number of jobs in the businesses, rather than 
the net number of new jobs facilitated by financing the business. 
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